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TAKING CHARGE OF COURT-MARTIAL
CHARGES: THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF
THE COMMANDER IN THE AMERICAN
MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM
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David A. Schlueter* & Lisa M. Schenck**
ABSTRACT: The authors address the repeated efforts to remove the
commander, a commissioned officer in command or an officer in
charge, from the military justice system and adopt a system that
mirrors the procedures used in foreign countries for preferring
charges, referring them to trial, and selecting court members. They
offer a number of arguments for retaining the commander’s role and
offer a comparative analysis of the American military justice system
and several other countries’ military justice systems. They urge

Currently a law professor at St. Mary’s University School of Law in San Antonio,
Texas, with over 48 years of experience with the military justice system as an active
duty, reserve, and now retired member of the Army Judge Advocate General’s Corps.
While on active duty from 1972 to 1981, Professor Schlueter served as an appellate
counsel, a prosecutor, and an instructor at the Army’s Judge Advocate General Legal
Center and School. He has also served as member of the Department of Defense UCMJ
Code Committee. He has authored or co-authored four treatises on military crimes,
procedures, and evidence, and frequently speaks to military lawyers and judges on
those topics. We acknowledge Professor Schlueter’s research assistant, Mr. Taylor
Newman, St Mary’s University School of Law, J.D. 2021 for his assistance with the
article. This article does not reflect St. Mary’s University School of Law, the University,
or the Department of Defense.
** Currently Associate Dean for Academic Affairs at George Washington University
Law School, teaching military justice as a professorial lecturer in law, with over 30
years of experience with the military justice system, including as an active duty Army
judge advocate serving as an appellate judge, prosecutor, special assistant U.S.
attorney, and assistant professor at the United States Military Academy, West Point.
She has served on numerous Departments of Defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force
panels tasked with studying the military justice system, including the Department of
Defense UCMJ Code Committee. This article does not reflect George Washington
University Law School, George Washington University, or the Department of Defense.
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Congress not to adopt the procedures used in foreign countries
absent clear evidence that doing so will greatly enhance American
military justice. They conclude there are insufficient reasons to make
dramatic changes to the American system; changes they believe
would undermine the commander’s authority to enforce discipline
and justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
If there is one aspect of the American military justice system that
seems to draw the most criticism, it is the role of the commander.
Although the commander has played an essential role in military
justice since the beginning of the republic, 1 reformers over the
decades have banged the drum for change, which would either
reduce or remove the commander’s prosecutorial discretion. 2
The proposals to limit or remove the commander’s powers to
prefer court-martial charges or convene a court-martial generally fall
into three categories. The first category of proposals recommends
that the decision to charge an accused with a crime should be made

See generally DAVID A. SCHLUETER, MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, § 1-4, et. seq. (10th ed. 2018) (discussing the historical roots of the courtmartial and the commander’s role).
2 See, e.g., Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, Breaking The Chain Of Command Culture: A Call
For An Independent And Impartial Investigative Body To Curb Sexual Assaults In The
Military, 29 WIS. J. L. GENDER & SOC'Y 341, 371-75 (2014) (recommending that DOD
strip military commanders of authority to dispose of sexual assault complaints;
authority to handle cases should rest with independent and impartial body after
military police conduct a comprehensive investigation); Don Christensen, Commanders
Flunk on Military Justice Reforms, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 3, 2014, 8:34 AM),
archived at https://perma.cc/Q8AS-MTH8 (criticizing the current military justice
system and proposing reform); Edward F. Sherman, Military Justice Without Military
Control, 82 YALE L.J. 1398, 1400 n.10 (1973) (noting that proposed legislative reforms
had been introduced by Senators Bayh and Ervin and by Congressman Bennett that
included limiting a commander's role and limiting court-martial jurisdiction);
Schiesser & Benson, A Proposal to Make Courts-Martial Courts: The Removal of
Commanders from Military Justice, 7 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 559 (1976).
1
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by a commander outside the accused’s chain of command, but still
within the military command structure.3 These proposals, which are
not entirely new,4 are grounded in the view that a commander may
be biased in favor of an accused and decide, for improper reasons,
not to charge said accused.5 Ironically, in the past, reformers pushed
for changes in the military justice system because they believed the
system was unfair; they argued that heavy-handed commanders
were tipping the scales of justice to obtain convictions.6 The recent

See, e.g., Laura Basset, Senators Shoot Down Gillibrand's Military Sexual Assault Reform
Bill, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 11, 2013, 2:10 PM), archived at
https://perma.cc/J8EH-GHUD. As discussed, infra, Senator Gillibrand introduced
essentially the same bill in 2020 (discussing Senator Gillibrand’s sponsorship of the
Military Justice Improvement Act (MJIA) which proposed that commanders would no
longer have jurisdiction over specified offenses and the commander’s power to grant
post-trial clemency would be limited. S. 967, 113th Cong. (2013). Her proposal
ultimately failed in the Senate).
4 See, e.g., Eugene R. Fidell, What is to be done? Herewith a Proposed Ansell-Hodson Military
Justice Reform Act of 2014 (May 13, 2014), archived at https://perma.cc/4WMA-9HSX
(proposing “Ansell-Hodson Military Justice Reform Act of 2014” which would have
reduced commander’s authority and transferred authority of convening authority to
court-martial administrator).
5 See Lindsay Hoyle, Command Responsibility—A Legal Obligation to Deter Sexual Violence
in the Military, 37 B.C. INT’L & & COMP. L. REV. 353, 360 (2014) (noting that commanders
are often biased in favor of an accused with whom they have a good working
relationship). But the opposite is also true. Critics of the system argue commanders
may be biased against a service member and treat that service member unfairly; it was
that criticism which in part led to the adoption of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
following World War II. See David A. Schlueter, The Court-Martial: An Historical Survey,
87 MIL. L. REV. 131, 158 (1980) (noting the perceived injustice toward service members
in World War II); Frederick Bernays Weiner, The Seamy Side of the World War I CourtMartial Controversy, 123 MIL. L. REV. 109, 112 (1989) (noting prosecution of enlisted
service members, in part, prompted the “Crowder-Ansell” dispute during World War
I concerning court-martial practices and its underlying currents). Yet another related
criticism is commanders may treat similarly situated service members differently.
James W. Smith, A Few Good Scapegoats: The Abu Ghraib Courts-Martial and the Failure of
the Military Justice System, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 671, 693 (2006) (using the term
“different spanks for different ranks” and arguing the military justice system failed by
treating officers and enlisted members differently in Abu-Ghraib courts-martial).
6 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
3
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push for removing the commander seems to rest on the proposition
that not enough alleged offenders are being prosecuted for sexual
assault.
A second category of proposals recommends that civilian
prosecutors handle prosecution of military offenses, which is the
approach in certain other countries. 7 The proponents of that
approach argue that the change would be consistent with emerging
international norms. The argument is if that approach works well in
other countries, it would likely work well in the American military
justice system.8
Finally, there have been proposals to transfer, in whole or in part,
the commander’s prosecutorial powers to military lawyers.9 One of

See generally Eugene R. Fidell, A World-Wide Perspective on Change in Military Justice,
48 A.F. L. REV. 195, 197 (2000) (noting that changes in country after country are being
made as to how military cases are prosecuted, and by whom and that American
military justice “pays precious little attention to developments in other countries’
systems;” the author is a frequent advocate for reducing the role of the commander in
the military justice system); Edward F. Sherman, Military Justice Without Military
Control, 82 YALE L.J. 1398, 1400 (1973) (noting that in considering potential changes to
the military justice system, other countries’ approaches are “especially relevant”).
8 See Editorial, No Hope for Justice, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 17, 2014, 4:00 AM), archived
at https://perma.cc/844K-CY46 (discussing reasoning of supporters such as New
York Senator Kirsten Gillibrand for removing sexual assault crimes in the U.S. military
justice system from the chain of command, in the same manner as Canada, Israel and
Germany have done); Remove Prosecution of Sexual Assault from Military Chain of
Command, Nat’l Org. for Women, archived at https://perma.cc/8LMS-8ALW
(discussing the need to remove sexual assault crimes from the chain of command in
the U.S. military justice system and adopt a separate system like Britain, Canada, and
Israel); Op-Ed., Gillibrand Should Keep Up the Pressure to End Sexual Assaults in The
Military, THE BUFFALO NEWS (Mar. 13, 2014), archived at https://perma.cc/S3983GXV (emphasizing that removal of sexual assaults from the chain of command has
already occurred in Britain, Canada, and Israel, and should occur in the United States
military justice system).
9 See, e.g., Elizabeth Murphy, The Military Justice Divide: Why Only Crimes and Lawyers
Belong in The Court-Martial Process, 220 MIL. L. REV. 129, 175 (2014) (proposing that
military lawyers obtain prosecutorial discretion over disposition of offenses); Letter
7
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the arguments supporting that approach is that armed forces lawyers
are in the best position to assess whether a particular charged offense
warrants a court-martial10 and that, again, is the approach taken in
certain other countries.11
It is this third and final category of proposals that is the focus of
this article. There are currently two proposed legislative provisions
along these lines that would adversely affect the commander’s
prosecutorial discretion and undermine the commander’s ability to
enforce good order and discipline. The first proposed provision was
included in Section 540F of the 2020 National Defense Authorization
Act, where Congress mandated that the Department of Defense
report to the congressional armed services committees. This would
be based on the feasibility of creating a pilot program, which would
remove a commander’s authority to prefer and refer to trial court-

from Heidi Boghosian, Exec. Dir., National Lawyers Guild to Mr. Paul S. Koffsky,
Deputy Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Defense (June 30, 2014), archived at
https://perma.cc/B3C8-NEPR (recommending that prosecutorial discretion be
placed in the hands of independent prosecutors).
10 See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 9, at 175–76 (2014) (listing reasons for military attorneys
to exert prosecutorial discretion instead of commanders).
11 See Sherman, supra note 2, at 1425 (arguing the American military justice system
should follow the model used in the British or West German-Swedish military
systems); see also No Hope for Justice, supra note 8 (discussing the reasoning of
supporters such as New York Senator Kirsten Gillibrand for removing sexual assault
crimes in the U.S. military justice system “from the chain of command to independent
prosecutors,” in the same manner as used in Canada, Israel and Germany); Remove
Prosecution of Sexual Assault from Military Chain of Command, Nat’l Org. for Women,
supra note 8 (discussing the need to remove sexual assault crimes from the chain of
command in the U.S. military justice system and adopt a separate system like Britain,
Canada, and Israel); Gillibrand Should Keep Up the Pressure to End Sexual Assaults in The
Military, supra note 8 (emphasizing that the removal of sexual assaults from the chain
of command has already occurred in Britain, Canada, and Israel, and should also occur
in the United States military justice system).
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martial charges for serious offenses, and instead place that authority
in the hands of senior armed forces lawyers. 12

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-92, § 540F,
133 Stat. 1198 (2019). This section provides:
12

SEC. 540F. REPORT ON MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM INVOLVING
ALTERNATIVE AUTHORITY FOR DETERMINING WHETHER TO
PREFER OR REFER CHANGES FOR FELONY OFFENSES UNDER THE
UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE.
(a) REPORT REQUIRED.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 300 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees on
Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a report
setting forth the results of a study, conducted for purposes of the report, on
the feasibility and advisability of an alternative military justice system in
which determinations as to whether to prefer or refer charges for trial by
court-martial for any offense specified in paragraph (2) is made by a judge
advocate in grade O–6 or higher who has significant experience in criminal
litigation and is outside of the chain of command of the member subject to
the charges rather than by a commanding officer of the member who is in
the chain of command of the member.
(2) SPECIFIED OFFENSE.—An offense specified in this paragraph is any
offense under chapter 47 of title 10, United States Code (the Uniform Code
of Military Justice), for which the maximum punishment authorized
includes confinement for more than one year.
(b) ELEMENTS.—The study required for purposes of the report under
subsection (a) shall address the following:
(1) Relevant procedural, legal, and policy implications and considerations
of the alternative military justice system described in subsection (a).
(2) An analysis of the following in connection with the implementation and
maintenance of the alternative military justice system: (A) Legal personnel
requirements. (B) Changes in force structure. (C) Amendments to law. (D)
Impacts on the timeliness and efficiency of legal processes and court-martial
adjudications. (E) Potential legal challenges to the system. (F) Potential
changes in prosecution and conviction rates. (G) Potential impacts on the
preservation of good order and discipline, including the ability of a
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The second proposal appears in the “Military Justice
Improvement Act of 2020” (S.1932), introduced by Senator Kirstin
Gillibrand (D-N.Y.), and would dramatically reduce the
commander’s authority and responsibility for preferring and
referring felony-level offenses to trial by court-martial, and transfer
that authority to senior judge advocates.13
This article argues that those proposals, and others like them,
should be rejected for the following reasons:
•
Commanders play a critical and necessary role in the
American military justice system (See Sections II & IV,
infra);
•
Transferring prosecutorial discretion from commanders
to judge advocates will undermine commanders’
authority to maintain good order and discipline (See
Section V, infra);

commander to carry out nonjudicial punishment and other administrative
actions. (H) Such other considerations as the Secretary considers
appropriate.
(3) A comparative analysis of the military justice systems of relevant foreign
allies with the current military justice system of the United States and the
alternative military justice system, including whether or not approaches of
the military justice systems of such allies to determinations described in
subsection (a) are appropriate for the military justice system of the United
States.
(4) An assessment of the feasibility and advisability of conducting a pilot
program to assess the feasibility and advisability of the alternative military
justice system, and, if the pilot program is determined to be feasible and
advisable— (A) an analysis of potential legal issues in connection with the
pilot program, including potential issues for appeals; and (B)
recommendations on the following: (i) The populations to be subject to the
pilot program. (ii) The duration of the pilot program. (iii) Metrics to measure
the effectiveness of the pilot program. (iv) The resources to be used to
conduct the pilot program.
13 The Military Justice Improvement Act, S. 1932, 116th Cong. (2020).
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Transferring the decision to prosecute and refer charges
to a court-martial will create unintended consequences
(See Section VI, infra);
•
Changing the American military justice system to
emulate the systems of other countries is not warranted
or advisable. Comparison of sexual assault prosecution
rates of the United States military with four United
States allies in 2013 and with three allies more recently
does not necessitate adopting their systems of removal
of command responsibility for prosecuting serious sex
crimes (See Section VII, infra);
•
The proposed amendments will adversely affect the
delicate balance between justice and discipline (See
Section VIII, infra);
•
Recent studies of command decisions to prosecute
sexual assaults demonstrates that the current system is
working (See Section IX, infra); and
•
Congress should await implementation of the reforms
outlined in the Military Justice Act of 2016 for oversight
and accountability (See Section X, infra).
Finally, this article recommends Congress should reaffirm the
role of the commander to enforce good order and discipline (See
Section XI, infra).
•

II. THE COMMANDER’S CURRENT ROLE IN THE MILITARY JUSTICE
SYSTEM
Before addressing the specific concerns about the proposals to
reduce or remove the commander from the military justice system, it
is important to first address the typical military chain of command
and how the individuals in that chain can be involved in the
processing of court-martial charges.
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A. THE MILITARY CHAIN OF COMMAND
The chain of command of an accused in an Army infantry
division, for example, begins with the immediate commander or unit
commander usually at the level of a company commander (captain
or O-3 rank in command of 200 personnel), followed by a battalion
commander (lieutenant colonel or O-5 in command of 1,000
personnel), brigade commander (colonel or O-6 rank in command of
5,000 personnel) and then by a division commander, who is a general
court-martial convening authority (major general or O-8 rank in
command of 15,000 personnel).
Various command levels above the division level are also general
courts-martial convening authorities, including the corps
commander (lieutenant general O-9 rank in command of 45,000
personnel), major command commander (general O-10 in command
of 90,000 personnel), then Secretary of the Army (civilian), Secretary
of Defense (civilian), and President. 14 Each higher level commander
in the chain of command has authority to overrule a decision of a
lower level of commander in the referral to trial of a court-martial
offense.15
B. PREFERRING AND REFERRING COURT-MARTIAL
CHARGES
Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the
Manual for Courts-Martial, commanders (usually the company
commander in the Army, for example) are responsible for

See Department of Defense, Military Units: Army–Department of Defense, archived
at https://perma.cc/J6JL-CF2P. See also 10 U.S.C. § 822 (listing general court-martial
convening authorities).
15 See Manual for Courts-Martial (2019) [hereinafter MCM]; Rule for Courts-Martial
306 [hereinafter RCM].
14
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conducting a thorough and impartial inquiry into alleged offenses. 16
In carrying out those duties, they review reports prepared by law
enforcement personnel and regularly obtain legal advice from a
judge advocate, who is assigned to the military organization, or
otherwise charged with providing legal advice to the commanders. 17
The UCMJ 18 includes punitive articles which proscribe both
strictly military offenses,19 such as desertion20 and disobedience of an
order 21 as well as common law offenses, such as larceny. 22 If it
appears that a service member has violated a punitive article, the
commander has broad discretion to decide how to dispose of an
accused's misconduct. For example, the commander may simply
counsel the service member or issue a written or oral reprimand,23
begin proceedings to administratively discharge the service
member, 24 or impose nonjudicial punishment. 25 Under this third
option, the commander decides whether the service member is guilty

16

RCM 303.
See UCMJ art. 37 (2018) (including requirement that before convening a general
court-martial the convening authority must consider the advice of the staff judge
advocate). This is sometimes referred to as the “pretrial advice.” SCHLUETER, supra
note 1 at § 7-3(A) (10th ed. 2018)
18 UCMJ arts. 1-146 (2018).
19 See generally DAVID A. SCHLUETER, CHARLES H. ROSE, VICTOR HANSEN, &
CHRISTOPHER BEHAN, MILITARY CRIMES AND DEFENSES § 3.2 (3d ed. 2018) (discussing
punitive articles in UCMJ).
20 UCMJ art. 85 (2018).
21 UCMJ art. 90 (2018).
22 UCMJ art. 121 (2018).
23 See SCHLUETER, supra note 1 at § 1-8 (10th ed. 2018) (listing various options available
to the military commander).
24 See SCHLUETER, supra note 1 at § 1-8(B) (10th ed. 2018) (discussing nonpunitive
measures such as administrative discharge).
25 UCMJ art. 15 (2018). Unless the service member is assigned to a vessel, the service
member may demand a court-martial in lieu of the nonjudicial punishment. Id. The
term “vessel” is defined in 1 U.S.C. § 3 (2012). “The word “vessel” includes every
description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used,
as a means of transportation on water.” 1 U.S.C. § 3 (2018).
17
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and, if so, adjudges the punishment.26 Finally, the commander may
formally prefer court-martial charges against the service member. 27
Article 33, of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, requires the
President to provide non-binding guidance for factors that
commanders are to consider in disposing of charges. 28 The President
has set out those factors in Appendix 2.1.2 of the Manual for CourtsMartial, which lists the following factors:
a. The mission-related responsibilities of the command;
b. Whether the offense occurred during wartime, combat, or
contingency operations;
c. The effect of the offense on the morale, health, safety,
welfare, and good order and discipline of the command;
d. The nature, seriousness, and circumstances of the offense
and the accused’s culpability in connection with the offense;
e. In cases involving an individual who is a victim under
Article 6b, the views of the victim as to disposition;
f. The extent of the harm caused to any victim of the offense;
g. The availability and willingness of the victim and other
witnesses to testify;
h. Admissible evidence will likely be sufficient to obtain and
sustain a conviction in a trial by court-martial;

See RCM 306(c)(2).
Although technically, any person subject to the UCMJ may prefer charges against
another; the preferral is almost always done by the service member’s immediate
commander.
28 UCMJ art. 33 (2018).
26
27
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i. Input, if any, from law enforcement agencies involved in
or having an interest in the specific case;
j. The truth-seeking function of trial by court-martial;
k. The accused’s willingness to cooperate in the investigation
or prosecution of others;
l. The accused’s criminal history or history of misconduct,
whether military or civilian, if any;
m. The probable sentence or other consequences to the
accused of a conviction; and
n. The impact and appropriateness of alternative disposition
options—including
nonjudicial
punishment
or
administrative action—with respect to the accused’s
potential for continued service and the responsibilities of the
command with respect to justice and good order and
discipline.29
If, after considering those factors, a commander prefers
court-martial charges, those charges are forwarded up the chain of
command, described supra, for recommendations and actions. If the
commander concludes that the charges are serious enough to justify
a general court-martial, which are equivalent to a civilian felony trial,
the commander orders an Article 32 hearing.30 At that hearing, which
approximates a preliminary hearing in civilian criminal justice trials,
the service member is entitled to be present, to have the assistance of
defense counsel, to cross-examine witnesses, and to have witnesses
produced.31

Non-Binding Disposition Guidance § 2.1, MCM, App. 2.1-2.
UCMJ art. 32. (2018).
31 UCMJ art. 32. (2018).
29
30
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If a convening authority, a commander authorized by the UCMJ
to “convene” a court-martial, decides to refer the charges to a courtmartial, that officer selects the court members. 32 The convening
authority does not select the counsel or the military judge. 33 A
commander convenes a court-martial to hear a specific case.34
Specific provisions in the UCMJ prohibit a convening authority
from unlawfully influencing the participants in the court-martial or
the outcome of the case. 35 In many cases, the accused and the
convening authority engage in plea bargaining and execute a pretrial
agreement. 36 Typically, those agreements require the accused to
plead guilty in exchange for a capped maximum sentence. 37

UCMJ arts. 23–24 (2018) (authority to convene general courts-martial, special courtsmartial, and summary courts-martial).
33 SCHLUETER, supra note 1 at § 8-3(D) (10th ed. 2018) (discussing the process for
selecting individuals to sit as court members).
34 See UCMJ arts. 22–24 (2018) (designating those with power to convene general,
special, and summary courts-martial); RCM 504 (setting out procedure for convening
courts-martial). The UCMJ provides that the President of the United States and a
service Secretary may convene a general court-martial. UCMJ art. 24(a), (2012).
35 See UCMJ art. 37 (2018). Unlawful command influence has been the subject of
considerable commentary and case law. See generally Martha Huntley Bower, Unlawful
Command Influence: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 28 A.F. L. REV. 65 (1988) (discussing
unlawful command influence); Anthony P. DeGiulio, Command Control: Lawful Versus
Unlawful Application, 10 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 72 (1972) (examining the disciplinary
policies established by command directives, the rule which blocks the accused from
serving as the convening authority, and command control over counsel and military
judges); James D. Harty, Unlawful Command Influence and Modern Military Justice, 36
NAVAL L. REV. 231 (1986) (discussing corrective measures that must be taken when
commanders commit unlawful command influence); Joseph Hely, Command Influence
on Military Justice, 15 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 300 (1970) (discussing inherent tendency for
command influence).
36 SCHLUETER, supra note 1, ch. 9 (10th ed. 2018).
37 Id.
32
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Even though courts-martial are not part of the federal judiciary,
the Supreme Court of the United States may ultimately review a
military conviction.38
III. OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND OF PROPOSALS TO LIMIT THE
COMMANDER’S ROLE IN THE MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM
As noted, supra, there are currently two pieces of legislation
pending in Congress that would shift prosecutorial discretion from
commanders to senior judge advocates, both attempting to emulate
the systems used in other countries. Notably, not all cases would be
affected by the shift in responsibilities from commanders to senior
judge advocates. Only disposition of serious offenses would be
affected. Offenses that are considered to be military in nature, and
not common law offenses, would remain untouched.
While neither of the proposed legislative provisions outline any
of the alleged problems that they are designed to address, attempts
to remove commanders from the military justice system are not new.
Similar legislation was proposed and rejected in 2013. 39 Since that

UCMJ art. 67(h) (2018); 28 U.S.C. § 1259 (2018). See, e.g., Ortiz v. United States, 138 S.
Ct. 2165, 2173 (2018) (holding that Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from the
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces). See generally Andrew Effron,
Supreme Court of Review of Decisions by the Court of Military Appeals: The Legislative
Background, ARMY LAW., Jan. 1985, at 59 (reviewing the Military Justice Act, which
placed the Court of Military Appeals directly under the U.S. Supreme Court’s review).
39 In 2013, Senator Gillibrand sponsored the Military Justice Improvement Act (MJIA)
which proposed that commanders would no longer have jurisdiction over specified
offenses and the commander’s power to grant post-trial clemency would be limited.
S. 967, 113th Cong. (2013). As with the currently proposed legislation, her bill would
have required that for offenses where the maximum punishment included
confinement for more than one year (in effect a felony grade offense), the decision to
file court-martial charges and refer charges to general or special courts-martial would
be made by someone in the rank of at least O-6, with significant experience in trying
courts-martial, and outside the chain of command. Id. That responsibility would be
handled by officers established by the Chiefs of Staff of each Service. Id. Although
38

222

New York University Journal of Law & Liberty

[Vol. 14:2

time, a series of advisory panels comprised of civilian, nongovernmental experts have reviewed the role of the commander and
rejected such a wide-sweeping change, because such change was not
justified. Specifically, the Response Systems to Adult Sexual Assault
Crimes Panel (RSP) (congressionally mandated to assess the impact
of removing disposition authority from commanders) in June 2014
reported that:
Congress should not further limit the authority of convening
authorities under the UCMJ to refer charges of sexual assault
crimes to trial by court-martial . . . [and] [a]fter reviewing the
practices of Allied militaries and available civilian statistics
and hearing from many witnesses, the Panel determined the
evidence [did] not support a conclusion that removing
convening authority from senior commanders [would]
reduce the incidence of sexual assault . . . or improve the
quality of investigations or prosecutions . . . .”40
And even before the extensive changes enacted in the Military
Justice Acts of 2016 and 2018, the Panel warned that systematic
changes “should be considered carefully in the context of the many
changes” made to the “form and function of the military system.” 41
In 2015, the Military Justice Review Group focused on measures to
improve the process rather than revisiting the issue after the RSP’s
thorough review, and specifically recommended “[re]taining the
current procedures for the exercise of disposition discretion based
upon the interlocking responsibilities of military commanders, [S]taff

Senator Gillibrand’s bill had bipartisan support, it eventually failed in the Senate by a
close vote. See Basset, supra note 3.
40 Response Systems to Adult Sexual Assault Crimes Panel Report 6 (2014), archived
at https://perma.cc/8Q7U-CUJG.
41 Id.
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[J]udge [A]dvocates, and judge advocates.” 42 In 2019, the Defense
Advisory Committee on Investigation, Prosecution, and Defense of
Sexual Assault in the Armed Forces (DAC-IPAD) (tasked with
reviewing specific case dispositions), based on a review of 164
military investigative cases, found that “commanders’ disposition of
penetrative sexual assault complaints [were] reasonable in 95% of the
cases.”43 See Section IX, infra.
Furthermore, since 2013, extensive substantive changes to the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) (e.g., the Military Justice
Acts of 2016 and 2018) and Manual for Courts-Martial have been put
in place, and those changes require time for implementation and
reassessment of the military justice system before additional reforms
should be made. Provisions are in place requiring that convening
authorities’ decisions not to refer sexual assault cases must be
reviewed (See Section X, infra.), while also substantially limiting their
clemency authority. An appendix to the Manual for Courts-Martial
now provides commanders with factors they should consider in all
misconduct cases (e.g., “interests of justice,” “the views of the victim
as to disposition,” “the harm caused to any victim of the offense,”
and “good order and discipline”), inappropriate factors (e.g., “the
accused’s race or religion” and “political pressure”), and special
considerations (e.g., “whether the accused might face prosecution in
another jurisdiction”).44 Pursuant to the Military Justice Act of 2016,
convening authorities must have “periodic training regarding the
purposes and administration” of the UCMJ. 45 Additionally, judge

Military Justice Review Group, Report of the Military Justice Review Group Part I:
UCMJ Recommendations 300 (2015), archived at https://perma.cc/58Y7-528X.
43 Defense Advisory Committee on Investigation, Prosecution, and Defense of Sexual
Assault in the Armed Forces (DAC-IPAD) Third Annual Report 31 (2019), archived at
https://perma.cc/82DG-VCKS.
44 See Non-Binding Disposition Guidance § 2.1, Manual for Courts-Martial 2019, App
2.1-2 [hereinafter MCM].
45 UCMJ art. 137(d).
42
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advocates are to serve as Article 32, Preliminary Hearing Officers,
whenever practicable.46
IV. THE UCMJ, THE MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, AND
REGULATIONS RECOGNIZE THE CRITICAL ROLE OF THE
COMMANDER IN THE MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM
A. IN GENERAL
The UCMJ 47 and the Manual for Courts-Martial 48 entrust
commanders at all levels in the chain of command with responsibility
for the military justice system. In the Army regulation that defines
and describes the nature of command responsibility, there is a notso-subtle link between the UCMJ and the “purpose of military
discipline” related to the “controls and obligations imposed on them
by virtue of their military Service.” 49 Furthermore, “[c]ommanders
are responsible for everything their command does or fails to do.” 50
Congress, and not just the President, also weighs in on the scale and
scope of this responsibility. Section 3583 of Title 10 of the United
States Code, detailing the requirements for a commanding officer’s
exemplary conduct, reads:
All commanding officers and others in authority in the Army
are required ... [t]o show in themselves a good example of
virtue, honor, patriotism, and subordination ... [t]o be
vigilant in inspecting the conduct of all persons who are
placed under their command, ... [t]o guard against and
suppress all dissolute and immoral practices, and to correct,

See RCM 405(d)(A).
UCMJ arts. 1-146a.
48 See generally MCM.
49 See Army Regulation (AR) 600-20, Army Command Policy, para. 1-5c.(4)(b)).
50 Id. para. 2-1b.
46
47
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according to the laws and regulations of the Army, all
persons who are guilty of them, ... [t]o take all necessary and
proper measures, under the laws, regulations, and customs
of the Army, [and] [t]o promote and safeguard the morale,
the physical well-being, and the general welfare of the
officers and enlisted persons under their command or
charge.51
The commander’s critical role in the system has been part of this
country’s military justice system since the founding of the country.52
“The purpose of military law is to promote justice, to assist in
maintaining good order and discipline in the armed forces, to
promote efficiency and effectiveness in the military establishment,
and thereby to strengthen the national security of the United
States.”53 The commander’s critical role in the system has been part
of this country’s military justice system since the founding of the
country.54 Commanders must have substantial authority, especially
in combat situations, because it may be necessary to order military
personnel to accomplish hazardous missions. The burden must be on
the proponent of any limitation of the commander’s authority to
justify the limitation because limitations on the commander’s
authority automatically detract from the effectiveness of units in
combat.
Commanders for hundreds of years have praised the attributes
of good order and discipline and its positive impact on combat
effectiveness. General George Washington said, “[d]iscipline is the

10 U.S.C. § 3583.
See SCHLUETER, supra note 1 at §§ 1-4 to 1-6 (10th ed. 2018) (discussing history of the
court-martial).
53 MCM, pt. I, ¶ 3.
54 See SCHLUETER, supra note 1 at §§ 1-4 to 1-6 (10th ed. 2018) (discussing history of the
court-martial and discussing role of commanders in the system throughout that
history).
51
52
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soul of an army. It makes small numbers formidable; procures
success to the weak, and esteem to all.” 55 More recently, General
William Westmorland commented:
Discipline is an attitude of respect for authority which is
developed by leadership, precept, and training. It is a state
of mind which leads to a willingness to obey an order no
matter how unpleasant or dangerous the task to be
performed. Discipline conditions the soldier to perform his
military duty even if it requires him to act in a way that is
highly inconsistent with his basic instinct for selfpreservation. Discipline markedly differentiates the soldier
from his counterpart in civilian society. Unlike the order that
is sought in civilian society, military discipline is absolutely
essential in the Armed Forces.56
The Army Field Manual defined “disciplined soldiers” as
“orderly, obedient, controlled, and dependable. They do their duty
promptly and effectively in response to orders, or even in the absence
of orders.”57 Lieutenant General A. S. Collins, Jr., said:
The essential characteristics of a good army are that it be well
trained and well disciplined. These two characteristics are
apparent in every unit achievement, whether in peace or war.
Discipline derives and flows from training and serves to
emphasize a fundamental point essential to a philosophy of

U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington takes command of Continental Army
in 1775, (Apr. 15, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/WY5F-WAHW.
56 General (Retired) William C. Westmoreland, Military Justice—A
Commander’s Viewpoint, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 5 (1971-1972).
57 Army Field Manual 22-100, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington,
DC, (July 31, 1990) 42.
55
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training. That training is all encompassing. Training
permeates everything a military organization does.58
Additionally, commanders should be held accountable for
ensuring subordinates are disciplined for sexual assault offenses and
shifting that responsibility outside the chain of command will reduce
command emphasis on enforcing standards of good order and
discipline.
B. UNDER THE CURRENT AMERICAN MILITARY JUSTICE
SYSTEM, THE COMMANDER’S PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION IS BROAD
Military courts have recognized that the commander is vested
with broad discretion to decide how to best deal with discipline
problems in his or her command.59 As noted supra, the commander’s
options range from no action, verbal counseling, administrative
actions (such as a written letter of reprimand in the service member’s
file), or an administrative discharge, and even punitive actions such
as nonjudicial punishment or court-martial charges.60 Decisions on
serious allegations are made after consulting with the Staff Judge
Advocate or a military prosecutor, who are themselves members of
the command. 61 The Staff Judge Advocate is expected to provide
sound legal advice based on the nature and extent of the alleged

Id. at 49 (citing Arthur S. Collins, Jr., Common Sense Training. San Rafael, CA:
Presidio Press, 1978).
59 See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 14 M.J. 361, 365 (C.M.A. 1983) (commenting on the
authority to charge violations of the UCMJ, court indicated that the “convening
authority … is free to decide the number of offenses to charge….” The convening
authority decides what charges, if any, of those preferred should be referred to trial);
United States v. Hagen, 25 M.J. 78 (C.M.A. 1987) (courts are hesitant to review
decisions whether to prosecute, and there is a strong presumption that convening
authorities perform their function without bias).
60 See RCM 306.
61 See UCMJ art. 30.
58
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criminal activity, the availability and admissibility of evidence
against the accused, the needs of the command, the time necessary to
investigate and prosecute the case, and the likely outcome of a trial
on the merits. 62 Those are the types of decisions that local district
attorneys and United States Attorneys make on a daily basis. 63
However, in the military that decision is for the commander to
make, and not the lawyer. That is because the commander, not the
lawyer, is responsible for morale as well as good order and discipline
within the command.64
C. UNDER THE CURRENT AMERICAN MILITARY JUSTICE
SYSTEM, IT IS CRITICAL THAT THE COMMANDER HAVE
TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN HIS OR HER LEGAL
ADVISORS
Under the current system, Staff Judge Advocates serve as legal
advisors for the commanders of major commands, and for the
subordinate commands. It is critical the commanders trust and
confide in those legal advisors on matters involving military justice,
which in turn impact morale and good order and discipline. That
trust and confidence inures to the overall benefit of the command
when the command is deployed and commanders must count on

See UCMJ art. 37 (before convening a general court-martial the convening authority
must consider the advice of the staff judge advocate). This legal advice is generally
referred to as the “pretrial advice.” SCHLUETER, supra note 1 at § 7-3(A) (10th ed. 2018).
63 Definition: District Attorney (DA), Legal Information Institute, archived at
https://perma.cc/W39Y-EW8H (last visited Feb. 3, 2021).
64 See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (“a commander is charged with maintaining
morale, discipline, and readiness”); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 840 (1976) (holding
“nothing in the Constitution . . . disables a military commander from acting to avert
what he perceives to be a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of troops on
the base under his command.”); Relford v. Commandant, U.S. Disciplinary Barracks,
401 U.S. 355, 367 (1971) (holding it is “[t]he responsibility of the military commander
for maintenance of order in his command and his authority to maintain that order.”).
62

2020]

AMERICAN MILITARY JUSTICE

229

their legal advisors in matters far beyond military justice, such as
operational law, international agreements, and important military
and civilian personnel matters.
The proposed amendments establish a legal office outside the
chain of command that decides disposition of serious, non-military
offenses and would eliminate a major connection between legal
advisors and commanders. The commander’s legal advisor and the
convening authority would have no reason to meet to discuss
decisions about disposition of these offenses. The absence of these
direct, professional contacts would undermine this critical
relationship, not only in regard to military justice matters, but also
with respect to the broader legal issues commanders face at military
installations both in the United States and when deployed.
V. THE PROPOSED CHANGES WOULD UNDERMINE A
COMMANDER’S RESPONSIBILITY TO MAINTAIN GOOD
ORDER AND DISCIPLINE
A. THE PURPOSE AND FUNCTION OF THE MILITARY
JUSTICE SYSTEM—GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE
It is critical that Congress, in considering any amendments to the
UCMJ, recall that the primary function and purpose of the military
justice system is to enforce good order and discipline in the armed
forces.65
Traditionally, those who view military justice as primarily a
system of justice tend to see the commander’s role as a hindrance to
justice, nothing more than a relic of the past.66 Those who view the

See David A. Schlueter, The Military Justice Conundrum: Justice or Discipline?, 215 MIL.
L. REV. 1 (2013) (presenting historical and contemporary analysis of purpose and
functions of military justice and concluding that primary purpose of military justice
has always been, and should remain, enforcement of good order and discipline).
66 See supra note 2.
65
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system as primarily one for maintaining good order and discipline
instead see the commander’s role as indispensable. 67 In Curry v.
Secretary of the Army, 68 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision that the role
of the convening authority in taking various actions in a courtmartial case was constitutional. The court stated:
The power of the convening authority to refer charges to the
court-martial is justifiable on two grounds. First,
prosecutorial discretion may be essential to efficient use of
limited supplies and manpower. The decision to employ
resources in a court-martial proceeding is one particularly
within the expertise of the convening authority who, as chief
administrator as well as troop commander, can best weigh
the benefits to be gained from such a proceeding against
those that would accrue if men and supplies were used
elsewhere. The balance struck is crucial in times of crisis
when prudent management of scarce resources is at a
premium. Second . . . maintenance of discipline and order is
imperative to the successful functioning of the military. The
commanding officer’s power to refer charges may be
necessary to establish and to preserve both.
Most of the governing rules and regulations in the military
justice system attempt to balance the need for justice and discipline.69
More recently, critics have accused commanders of failing to ensure
prosecution of those accused of sexual assault. Despite the views of
some commentators that the military justice system is primarily a

See Schlueter, supra note 65.
595 F.2d 873, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
69 See, e.g., United States v. Littrice, 13 C.M.R. 43, 47 (C.M.A. 1953) (identifying “the
necessity of maintaining a delicate balance between justice and discipline.”).
67
68
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system of justice, the system’s function and purpose have not
changed since the original Articles of War were adopted in the
1700s. 70 Establishment of the current system’s framework in 1950
occurred only after numerous congressional hearings and multiple
studies, and that system has fared well. Notably, the United States
Supreme Court recently stated in Ortiz v. United States71 that “[t]he
procedural protections afforded to a service member are ‘virtually
the same’ as those given in a civilian criminal proceeding, whether
state or federal.”72
Notwithstanding all of the reforms that have taken place since
the founding of the nation, the American military justice system
remains a system designed to enforce discipline and good order. 73
Based on the low levels of prosecutions of sexual assault offenses
in the nations of several allies that have implemented the proposed
changes, the evidence does not support the theory that the change
will increase the level of U.S. military sexual assault prosecutions.
Because the United States military has an excellent reputation as a
combat-effective organization, the proponent for change should have
the burden of proving there is first of all a problem with military
prosecutions of sexual assaults, and the proposed remedy has a
reasonable probability of accomplishing the goal without creating
new problems. The proposed changes would be a severe and
unnecessary blow to the commander’s authority to enforce good
order and discipline and, if the result is the same as in allied

See Schlueter, supra note 65.
138 S.Ct. 2165 (2018).
72 Id. at 2174 (2018) (citing SCHLUETER, supra note 1 at § 1–7, p. 50 (10th ed. 2018)).
73 See id. at 2200 (“it is possible today to mistake a military tribunal for a regular court
and thus to forget its fundamental nature as an instrument of military discipline”)
(emphasis added); Schlueter, supra note 65.
70
71
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militaries, the change likely would result in fewer prosecutions of
perpetrators of serious crimes, including sexual assaults.
B. COMPARISON TO CIVILIAN PROSECUTORIAL DECISIONS
The proposed amendments to Article 30, UCMJ, which would
remove the commander as the decision maker in the military justice
process, would undermine the commander’s broad prosecutorial
discretion and would transfer the local commander’s decision to an
unspecified command structure outside the commander’s chain of
command, requiring the recommendations of a senior armed forces
lawyer, an individual disconnected in time and space from the
command.74 Such a modification would be tantamount to informing
a local district attorney that the decision to prosecute or not prosecute
serious cases would be made in the state capital by the State Attorney
General, or in the case of a federal criminal prosecution, in
Washington D.C.—and that the decision would be binding on local
authorities. Not only would that system undermine the effectiveness
of the district attorney’s and United States Attorney’s offices, it
would undermine the populace’s confidence in the ability of local
authorities to take care of local crime. The same is true in the military,
with commanders. Once members of a command discover that a
person with no connection to the command is making the decision
regarding court-martial charges, they will view the commander as
powerless to deal with serious offenses in a quick and efficient
manner.75

See The Military Justice Improvement Act, S. 1932, 116th Cong. (2020) (requiring
disposition of charges be referred to designated commissioned officers in grade O–6
or higher).
75 See generally Victor M. Hansen, The Impact of Military Justice Reforms on the Law of
Armed Conflict: How to Avoid Unintended Consequences, 21 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 229,
74
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C. THE PROPOSED CHANGES WOULD RESULT IN
ACADEMIC OR IVORY TOWER DECISIONS
Because a high-ranking lawyer outside the command would be
making decisions concerning serious court-martial charges, some
may view that exercise as primarily “academic,” being disconnected
from the real-world problems of the command—a true “ivory tower”
decision.76
The decision to prosecute almost always involves an armed
forces prosecutor personally interviewing potential witnesses,
reviewing the law enforcement reports, speaking personally to the
commanders in the chain of command, and providing an informed
“on the ground” assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the
case against an accused. 77 In deciding whether to prosecute an
accused, the prosecutor must make an informed assessment of
whether the available evidence supports the charges alleged. 78
Experienced litigators know that a case which looks strong on paper
can take on a different light after they personally interview witnesses
face-to-face, go over their pretrial statements, assess their demeanor,
and then decide whether they will be strong or weak witnesses.
Depending on the location of any central legal center charged with
deciding whether to go forward with charges, counsel in that office
will miss that opportunity. Most of those critical elements in the
decision-making process would be missing if the primary decision
authority rests in a high-ranking military lawyer, separated from the

266 (2013) (noting potential adverse impact on discipline if personnel perceive that
their commander is not able to punish them).
76 Ivory Tower Definition, Dictionary.com (2021), archived at https://perma.cc/YP9R7YXJ (defining an ivory tower as “an attitude of aloofness from or disdain or disregard
for worldly or practical affairs”).
77 SCHLUETER, supra note 1 at § 6-1(A)(3) (10th ed. 2018) (discussing factors that
commanders are to consider in preferring court-martial charges).
78 Id.
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real-world problems of that particular command. Electronic
evidence, memos, and e-mails are not an adequate substitute for a
decision made by the local commander after a careful assessment by
the commander’s local legal advisor. Thus, there is a real danger that
the senior armed forces lawyers would be making an ivory-tower
assessment of the evidence.
D. THE PROPOSED CHANGES WOULD UNDERMINE THE
CHAIN OF COMMAND
Under the current system, as discussed supra, it is the unit or company commander who usually initiates the charging process by asking the prosecutor assigned to their unit to prepare a charge sheet,
i.e., “preferring charges.”79 Usually, a decision is made after consulting the prosecutor assigned to that unit. 80 Each commander in the
chain of command is charged with considering the possible charges
and providing another level of assessment before it reaches the desk
of the commander who would be the convening authority on the
case.81 The proposed changes to the system are clearly intended to
disrupt the normal chain of command, and potentially create doubt
in the minds of the service members whether the commander has any
real disciplinary authority over them. One commentator has noted
that removing the commander's authority to prefer or refer charges

Any person subject to the UCMJ may prefer charges. RCM 307(a). Charges are
preferred through use of a charge sheet, DD Form 458. Charge sheets are typically
prepared by the legal office after conferring with the accused’s commander; the
commander then signs the charge sheet, and swears or affirms that he or she has
personal knowledge of the charges, or has investigated them, and that they are true.
RCM 307(a)(2).
80 SCHLUETER, supra note 1 at § 6-1(A)(3) (10th ed. 2018) (noting that commanders
usually seek advice from the military prosecutor).
81 See id. at § 6-2 (discussing forwarding of charges through summary court-martial
convening authority and the special court-martial convening authority to the general
court-martial convening authority).
79
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would seriously undermine that commander's authority within the
unit; in future cases the members of the unit might question or doubt
the commander's ability to initiate disciplinary proceedings against
them.82 At most the immediate commander would be able to make a
non-binding recommendation to the referral authority about initiation and disposition of offenses.
Under the proposals, the decision to prosecute or not prosecute
would be made completely out of the chain of command, and not by
the very commanders and lawyers who are in the best position to
make decisions that directly affect good order and discipline in that
command. Thus, the proposals would undermine the authority of the
commander to enforce discipline and justice in his or her unit.
E. FOR PURPOSES OF GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE,
THERE IS NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN COMMON LAW
OFFENSES AND MILITARY OFFENSES
In stripping the commander of the discretion to dispose of
serious offenses, the proposed changes appear to distinguish what
some refer to as “common-law” crimes from military crimes. 83 For

See generally Victor M. Hansen, The Impact of Military Justice Reforms on the Law of
Armed Conflict: How to Avoid Unintended Consequences, 21 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 229,
266 (2013). See also LTC Kyle G. Phillips, Military Justice and the Role of the Convening
Authority, U.S. Naval Institute, Vol. 146/5/1,407, May 2020, where the author writes:
The authority to administer discipline and hold people accountable is
woven into the fabric of the military system. Training, unit culture, esprit de
corps, and shared goals are essential for a healthy unit. The authority to
discipline and hold people accountable under the law is the backbone of
command authority. Stripping court-martial convening authority from
command authority would have the effect of severing the spinal cord—the
other movements of the “body” will be severely limited if not completely
incapacitated.
Archived at https://perma.cc/73NV-R9FE.
83 See SCHLUETER ET AL., supra note 19 at § 3.2 (3d ed. 2018) (providing an overview of
military crimes, including common law offenses and military-specific crimes).
82
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purposes of the military justice system, that distinction is
meaningless. In Solorio v. United States, 84 the Supreme Court
concluded that a court-martial had jurisdiction to try a Coast Guard
member who committed sexual misconduct offenses that occurred in
the civilian community. Among other sources, the Supreme Court
quoted General George Washington’s General Order dated February
24, 1779 which states:
All improper treatment of an inhabitant by an officer or
soldier being destructive of good order and discipline as well
as subversive of the rights of society is as much a breach of
military, as civil law and as punishable by the one as the
other.85
This reasoning remains just as valid today as it did when General
Washington wrote it over 240 years ago. Service members who
commit common law crimes such as larceny (Art. 121), sexual assault
(Art. 120), and murder (Art. 118), pose as much of a threat to good
order and discipline as do the crimes of desertion (Art. 85),
disobedience of an order (Art. 90), and conduct unbecoming an
officer and a gentleman (Art. 133), 86 and as such, are all proper
objects for the military justice system.

483 U.S. 435 (1987).
Id. at 445 n.10 (citing 14 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 140-141 (J. Fitzpatrick
ed. 1936)).
86 See e.g., United States v. Morgan; 40 C.M.R. 583, 586 (A.B.R. 1969) (“That a ‘barracks
thief’ creates problems for a unit commander is . . . common knowledge within the
military community.”). Most members of the military community, enlisted and
officers, understand the real danger to discipline and morale in a unit where an
accused has stolen a possession from a fellow service member in arms. It can
undermine trust and confidence in the ranks—qualities that are indispensable for
good order and discipline.
84
85
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THE PROBLEM OF MIXED OFFENSES

The proposed amendments create another issue when the
accused has committed multiple offenses—some of which are in the
excluded list of offenses (e.g., military offenses) and some of which
are on the included list (e.g., common-law offenses). Under the
proposals, who will make the ultimate decision to proceed with
court-martial charges in these mixed cases? For example, an accused
may be charged with sexual assault, conduct unbecoming an officer
and a gentleman, and disobedience of an order of a superior officer
to avoid contact with the sexual assault victim. Is that a decision for
the commander? Or the senior legal officer unconnected with the
command? Under the current system, that decision is made
efficiently by the local command without regard to whether the
offense is military in nature or a civilian-type offense. Additionally,
if the commander proceeds with offering the accused a summary
court-martial or nonjudicial punishment for the “purely” military
offenses, but the accused decides to demand trial by court-martial,
who will refer that case? (See Section VII, infra.).
The proposed system creates a needless and complicated
bifurcated system and an additional level of bureaucracy that in all
likelihood will present unintended consequences.
G. THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS THREATEN THE ABILITY
TO HOLD THE COMMANDER RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
OFFENSES OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMAND
Furthermore, if commanders no longer have the necessary
disciplinary role in preferring charges or referring them to trial for
service members’ misconduct, it could be difficult to hold them
personally responsible for the delicts of the service members under
their command.
CEOs of large organizations know that responsibility for the
organization must be accompanied by the authority to manage the
organization. To an even greater extent, the same holds true in the
military, because commanders make life and death decisions on the
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battlefield. They should be held accountable for their inability to
enforce good order and discipline, prospects which are undermined
by the proposed amendments.

H. THE AMENDMENTS APPARENTLY REINSTITUTE
PROCEDURES LONG-SINCE ABANDONED FOR
APPOINTING THE PARTICIPANTS TO A COURTMARTIAL
In the early days of the UCMJ, if a convening authority referred
court-martial charges to trial, that officer also appointed the members
of the court-martial panel, the trial counsel, and the defense counsel.
Over the years, the procedures changed. Now, the convening
authority appoints only the panel members who will serve as the
finders of fact at the court-martial. 87 They are the military’s
counterpart to jurors for a state or federal criminal case. The military
judge is assigned to the case by the independent Service’s trial
judiciary command.88 The defense counsel is assigned to represent
an accused by an independent chain of command for defense
counsel.89 The trial counsel (prosecutor) is selected by the Staff Judge
Advocate.90
Thus, the proposed amendments appear to reinstate a system
that has not existed in many years. It would apparently require the
Service Chiefs of Staff, located in the Pentagon, to create an office to
select not only the court-martial members, but also the military

UCMJ art. 25.
RCM 503(b)(1).
89 For example, in the Army defense counsel are appointed by the Chief, United States
Army Trial Defense Service or his delegee. Army Regulations 27-10, para. 6-9.
90 See Army Regulations 27-10, para. 5-3 (detailing of trial counsel by Staff Judge
Advocate or his delegee).
87
88
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judge, prosecutor, and defense counsel. 91 That leaves a clear
impression with the accused, and members of the public, that the
system has reverted to the day when it appeared that the courtmartial was stacked against the accused. In contrast to those
proposals, no United States Attorney or district attorney in the
civilian criminal justice systems has authority to select these trial
participants for cases being tried by their offices.
This scheme of someone other than an officer in the service’s
judiciary command making the appointment of a judge to a
particular court-martial could be perceived as the command handpicking a judge, and thus impacting the impartiality and
independence of the military judge. It could certainly be attacked in
the courts as depriving an accused of due process. 92
VI. THE PROPOSED CHANGES WOULD CREATE UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES
A. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCE: COMMANDER’S
INABILITY TO IMPOSE NONJUDICIAL PUNISHMENT OR
CONVENE SUMMARY COURT-MARTIAL
Under the proposed amendments to Article 30, a decision by a
lawyer not connected to the command would undermine the

See The Military Justice Improvement Act, S. 1932, 116th Cong. (2020) (requiring
“[e]ach Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces or Commandant” to “establish an office to
. . . convene general and special courts-martial” and detail the members of courtsmartial).
92 Cf. Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 180 (1994) (“Article 26 places military judges
under the authority of the appropriate Judge Advocate General rather than under the
authority of the convening officer. . . . [W]e believe this structure helps protect
[judicial] independence. . . . Judge Advocates General . . . have no interest in the
outcome of a particular court-martial . . . .”). The problem could arise where someone
in the prosecutorial chain of command believed that a particular military judge was
lenient on sentencing convicted service members and the appointing authority picked
a judge who was more inclined to impose harsher punishments.
91
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commander’s ability to deal with the alleged offenses in some other
forum. For example, the amendment indicates that a decision not to
proceed with court-martial charges would not limit the ability of the
commander to proceed with a summary court-martial 93 or
nonjudicial punishment.94 But that creates potential problems with
actual implementation. Article 15 provides that unless a service
member is attached to a vessel, the service member can turn down
the commander’s proposed Article 15 procedures and demand a
court-martial. The same is true for a summary court-martial; the
accused must consent, whether or not the accused is assigned or
attached to a vessel. If the commander offers the accused an Article
15 for certain offenses, or prefers summary court-martial charges, the
accused can refuse to proceed, and the centralized legal authority
could choose to prohibit a court-martial for those offenses. Thus, the
accused can effectively “check-mate” the commander from enforcing
decisions to conduct a summary court-martial or impose nonjudicial
punishment under Article 15.
B. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCE: DECIDING WHETHER TO
IMPOSE PRETRIAL CONFINEMENT
Under the current system, a commander may place an accused
in pretrial confinement pending disposition of the charges. 95 The
system provides for both command review and judicial review of
that decision by a military magistrate or judge.96 The current system
is an integrated and coordinated decision by the chain of command,
which in large part depends on the probable disposition of the
charges. The proposed scheme—which takes the decision to refer a

UCMJ art. 24.
UCMJ art. 15.
95 RCM 305.
96 Id.
93
94
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case to trial out of the chain of command—creates uncertainty as to
whether that current system of dealing with pretrial confinement
issues can be maintained because the immediate commander will no
longer be the person who decides whether there is probable cause
that the person being confined committed the offense.97 The function
of deciding that sufficiency of the evidence will be transferred to the
centralized legal authority, and having one Department of Defense
(DOD) entity put the accused into pretrial confinement and another
DOD entity refuse to initiate charges would be incongruous,
inefficient, and reflect poorly on the immediate commander or the
centralized legal authority or both.
C. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCE: THE PROPOSED SCHEME
COULD PRESENT SPEEDY TRIAL PROBLEMS
The military justice system currently recognizes several speedy
trial protections—constitutional, statutory, and regulatory. 98 Those
protections are triggered by the preferral of court-martial charges
and/or pretrial confinement of the accused. Under the current
system commanders and legal advisors work together to ensure that
the case moves in a timely and efficient manner. Vesting the decision
to refer charges to a court-martial in a legal office, separated by time
and distance, poses significant speedy trial concerns.

See generally, MCM; RCM 305(d):
When a person may be confined. No person may be ordered into pretrial
confinement except for probable cause. Probable cause to order pretrial
confinement exists when there is a reasonable belief that: (1) An offense
triable by court-martial has been committed; (2) The person confined
committed it; and (3) Confinement is required by the circumstances.
98 See SCHLUETER, supra note 1 at § 13-3(D) (10th ed. 2018) (discussing speedy trial
rights available to a military accused under the Fifth Amendment, the Sixth
Amendment, the UCMJ, and the Manual for Courts-Martial).
97
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D. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCE: THE PROPOSED SCHEME
COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT PLEA BARGAINING
As in the civilian community, the military justice system depends
heavily on the ability of a convening authority and an accused to
enter into a pretrial agreement.99 Those agreements typically require
the accused to enter a plea of guilty in return for reduction of charges,
dismissal of some of the charges, or a sentence limitation. 100 The
proposed amendments fail to address that critical feature of the
system. If the centralized legal authority decides to proceed with
court-martial charges, that decision is binding on any convening
authority. Does that mean that a convening authority could not
subsequently enter into plea bargaining with the accused which
results in the dismissal of a serious charge? The answer to that
question does not lie in drafting additional statutory language, nor
in directing the President to solve the problem through a myriad of
amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial or existing Service
regulations—those measures would simply add a level of
bureaucracy to a system that currently operates efficiently and fairly.

See generally Bradford D. Bigler, A New Paradigm for Plea Agreements Under the 2016
MJA, ARMY LAW. no. 6, 2019, at 48 (in-depth discussion of changes to plea bargaining
after 2016 Military Justice Act; author compares the “legacy” system of plea bargaining
to the new system; the author notes that if the accused pleads guilty to all charges and
specifications, the judge sentences the accused at an Article 39(a) session); Joseph P.
Della Maria, Jr., Negotiating and Drafting the Pretrial Agreement, 25 JAG J. 117 (1971);
Gray, Negotiated Pleas in the Military, 37 Fed. B.J. 49 (1978); Bruce A. Haddenhorst &
Maryalice David, Guilty Pleas: A Primer for Judge Advocates, 39 A.F. L. REV. 87 (1996);
Carlton L. Jackson, Plea Bargaining in the Military: An Unintended Consequence of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 179 MIL. L. REV. 1 (2004); Donald F. Melhorn, Jr.,
Negotiating Pleas in Naval Courts-Martial, 16 JAG J. 103 (1962); Brian B. McMenamin, Plea
Bargaining in the Military, 10 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 93 (1971). For a sample pretrial
agreement, see K. JANSEN ET AL., MILITARY CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FORMS, § 4-9 (3d ed.
2009).
100 See RCM 705.
99
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E. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCE: THE PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS MAY ADVERSELY AFFECT AGREEMENTS
WITH LOCAL CIVILIAN PROSECUTORS
At many installations there are agreements with local
prosecutors (state and federal) as to which office—military or
civilian—will prosecute an accused. 101 Those agreements are
beneficial in promoting good community relations between the local
command and the surrounding civilian community. The proposed
amendments make no provision for such agreements. Is it intended
that after the Judge Advocate General’s Corps Colonel (O-6) or Navy
Captain (O-6) legal advisor decides to prosecute a case, the local
agreements are no longer operative? Would the O-6 be bound by
such agreements? Is the O-6 required to contact the local civilian
prosecutor and decide on the next best steps? In either event, the local
command would have no authority to resolve the issues, even
though the decision could have an impact on local military-civilian
relations.

See MCM, App. 4. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Departments of
Justice and Transportation (Coast Guard) Relating to the Investigations and
Prosecution of Crimes Over Which the Two Departments Have Concurrent
Jurisdiction; see also Office of the District Attorney, 27th Judicial District of Texas, Bell
County (“Through an agreement with the Commanding General for III Corps and Fort
Hood, virtually all felony cases involving military defendants are deferred to the
Army for prosecution by court martial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. An
aggressive liaison program between the III Corps Staff Judge Advocate’s office and
the District Attorney’s Office insures that common problems are dealt with
effectively.”), archived at https://perma.cc/BN89-KV93. Several cases illustrate the
three jurisdictions that may choose to prosecute a case. See, e.g., Jones v. United States,
527 U.S. 373 (1999) (army retiree, convicted of kidnapping a private from an Air Force
base and murdering her, sentenced to death by a district court); United States v.
Hennis, 79 M.J. 370 (CAAF 2020) (former Army member, convicted of murdering the
wife and two daughters of an Air Force captain, sentenced to death by an Army courtmartial); United States v. Gray, 51 M.J. 1 (CAAF 1999) (servicemember, convicted of
two murders, sentenced to life in prison by a state court).
101
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For example, in the current system if a commander elects not to
refer sexual offenses to courts-martial, a superior convening
authority may refer the offense to courts-martial. If the offense
occurred on a military installation with exclusive federal jurisdiction,
the United States Attorney may prosecute the case in a United States
District Court. If the offense occurred elsewhere in the United States,
a district attorney could prosecute the case. Thus, the commander’s
decision not to prosecute does not end the case—there may still be
prosecution in other venues.
VII. CONGRESS SHOULD NOT LOOK TO OTHER COUNTRIES’
SYSTEMS AS MODELS FOR AMERICAN MILITARY JUSTICE
UNLESS THERE IS CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT THOSE FOREIGN
SYSTEMS ARE MORE EFFECTIVE
A. IN GENERAL
The proposed amendments seem to rest on the view that first,
military commanders are not to be trusted in exercising prosecutorial
discretion, 102 and second, that Congress should follow the lead of
other countries and adopt procedures used in countries such as
Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom. That argument is
reminiscent of debates over whether other countries’ laws should
serve as a model for American legal systems. In hearings on earlier
similar legislative proposals, some commentators have urged
Congress to go further and apply this approach to the prosecution of
all cases by civilian prosecutors. The argument is that the United
States’ military justice system is an “outlier” that is somehow
deficient. Presumably justice systems used in other democratic

Cf. Don Christensen, A Comment on the Latest White Paper, Global Military Justice
Reform (July 26, 2020), archived at https://perma.cc/F8MG-LVNY (suggesting that
commanders are not capable of making decisions about which cases should be tried
by court-martial).
102
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countries are designed to suit the political and military goals of those
particular countries, and those democratic countries are profoundly
different from the United States in numbers of military personnel,
military budgets, and worldwide size and type of military
operations. There may be aspects of those systems that could be
effectively applied to the United States military. However, before
changes from our allies are applied to the United States military they
should at least meet a threshold showing that they are applied to
prosecute enough cases to show they are indeed effective.
The American military justice system is similar to the civilian
justice system. 103 This procedural similarity makes the military
justice system easier for civilians to understand, and the same
rationale for decentralized decisions for most prosecutions has the
same basis in both systems. Civilians recognize that a decentralized
decision whereby local district attorneys and U.S. attorneys decide
whether a person is charged is best for fairness because local
circumstances are considered. There is no need to look to other
countries for guidance on who should make the charging decision
for the military any more than one should seek foreign guidance on
whether authority to prosecute should be shifted to a centralized
authority for civilians.
Dramatic changes should not be considered before the evidence
establishes there is a problem in the military’s prosecution of sexual
assault offenses. Any change that is made should not be made before
there has been testing and analysis. Allied militaries in democracies
that complete a handful of sexual assault prosecutions provide
limited anecdotal evidence at best and do not support change for the
vastly larger United States military.

Cf. Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2174 (2018) (“[t]he procedural protections
afforded to a service member are ‘virtually the same’ as those given in a civilian
criminal proceeding, whether state or federal.”) (citing SCHLUETER, supra note 1 at § 1–
7, p. 50 (10th ed. 2018)).
103
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United States commanders are professional, well trained and
highly educated.104 Those who fail to perform are usually removed
from command or denied valued promotions. 105 Lawyers who
advise them also are well trained and highly educated, and there are
consequences if they fail to perform. Before Congress gives any
serious consideration to adopting the procedures used in other
countries, it should compare those systems in terms of size of the
military force, the world-wide and geographical disbursement of
military personnel, purpose of those military justice systems, the
history and experience of those systems, and the country’s
expectations for its commanders in enforcing good order and
discipline.
Commentators have written that “[t]he [foremost] distinctive
factor that separates the United States military from all other
militaries is its ability to ‘command the commons.’”106 “America is

See generally Kimberly Jackson et. al., Raising the Flag: Implications of U.S. Military
Approaches to General and Flag Officer Development, 30–44 (Rand Corporation, 2020),
archived at https://perma.cc/Y5FW-JHB (detailing military assignment history,
professional military and civilian education, special training, and evaluation
requirements of officers in the Armed Forces).
105 For example, in December 2020, 14 Army leaders at Fort Hood, Texas, including
two major generals were suspended or relieved from command after an investigation
determined that they had a command climate that “allowed sexual assault and
harassment to proliferate, and that Army CID agents at the post were underexperienced and over-assigned.” Kyle Rempfer, Fourteen leaders relieved or suspended
after scathing report on Fort Hood, ARMY TIMES (Dec. 8, 2020), archived at
https://perma.cc/KLR3-R7FB. See also Report of the Fort Hood Independent Review
Committee, U.S. ARMY iii, 64, 75 (Nov. 6, 2020) (noting problems with the handling of
victims, deficiencies in the Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention
(SHARP) Program, inexperienced investigators, and “a large number of sexual assault
cases were lost or dismissed at court-martial partially due to investigations that are
rote and lack essential evidence.”), archived at https://perma.cc/QEH3-DMNR.
106 CRAIG CARUANA, AMERICAN POWER: STILL THE BEST HOPE FOR PEACE 77 (2012).
104
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the only country that can project military might globally.” 107 “The
military justice system . . . goes wherever the troops go–to provide
uniform treatment regardless of locale or circumstances.” 108 Given
the global nature of America’s armed forces, commanders must have
the ability to “expeditiously deal with misconduct to prevent
degradation of the unit’s effectiveness and cohesion.” 109
Legal counsel to the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
has stated that:
While many countries can afford for the center of the[ir]
military justice systems to be located . . . far from the arenas
of international armed conflict, we require a more flexible
capability that can travel with the unit as it operates in any
part of the world.110 Any delay in “disciplinary action will
invariably prejudice good order.”111

Stephen Calabresi, “A Shining City On A Hill”: American Exceptionalism And The
Supreme Court’s Practice Of Relying On Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1335, 1392 (2006)
(quoting JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE RIGHT NATION:
CONSERVATIVE POWER IN AMERICA (2004)).
108 James B. Roan and Cynthia Buxton, The American Military Justice System in the New
Millennium, 52 A.F. L. REV. 185, 191 (2002).
109 Id.
110 Report of the role of the Commander Subcomm. to the Response Systems to Adult Sexual
Assault Crimes Panel 108 (2014), archived at https://perma.cc/N6LJ-9HFM (testimony
of Brigadier General Richard C. Gross, U.S. Army).
111 In this same vein the late Judge Robinson O. Everett, former Chief Judge of the
Court of Military Appeals, cogently pointed out: “[J]ustice delayed is justice defeated.
. . . In military life, where to maintain discipline, the unpleasant consequences of
offenses must be quick, certain and vivid—not something vague in the remote future.”
Id. (quoting ROBINSON O. EVERETT, MILITARY JUSTICE IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
UNITED STATES (1956)).
107
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Finally, as discussed in the following sections, it is important to
point out that the American military justice system deals with
different types of caseloads.112
Even assuming that there is some merit in adopting another
country's approach to military justice, the burden is on the reformers
to show that the American model is indeed lacking, and that
adopting the other countries’ models will not adversely impact good
order and discipline.
B. STATISTICAL COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND THREE COUNTRIES WHERE ATTORNEYS
REFER CASES TO COURTS-MARTIAL
On April 20, 2020, a Shadow Advisory Group (SAG) issued a
report to the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House
Armed Services Committee.113 The report addressed Section 540F of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L.
No. 116-92, 133 Stat. 1198 (Dec. 19, 2019) (FY20 NDAA), and noted
(as mentioned previously) that Section 540F(b)(a)(3) of the National
Defense Authorization Act directs a report containing, among other
elements,
(3) A comparative analysis of the military justice systems of
relevant foreign allies with the current military justice
system of the United States and the alternative military

As noted by the legal counsel to the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Staff:
“[T]he scope and scale of our allies’ caseloads are vastly different than ours. None of
our allies handle the volume of cases that the U.S. military does. This is likely due to
the greater size of our military forces in comparison.” See Report of the role of the
Commander, supra note 110.
113 Shadow Advisory Report Group of Experts, Alternative Authority for Determining
Whether to Prefer or Refer Charges for Felony Offenses Under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, Apr. 20, 2020 [hereinafter SAG Report].
112
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justice system, including whether or not approaches of the
military justice systems of such allies to determinations
described in subsection (a) are appropriate for the military
justice system of the United States.114
The SAG Report indicated that 7 of 15 relevant allies do not
prosecute non-military offenses, such as sexual assault, by courtsmartial during peace time that occur in their countries. 115 The
remaining 8 allies utilize lawyers to charge offenses and refer them
to trial.116 The military forces of two allies (Ireland and New Zealand)
have fewer than 10,000 personnel in their militaries. 117 Five allied
countries—Australia, Canada, Israel, 118 Italy, and the United

See id. (addressing Section 540F of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-92, 133 Stat. 1198 (Dec. 19, 2019) (FY20 NDAA)).
115 Id. at App. 16-17. As an example, Germany no longer has peacetime courts-martial.
Criminal cases are tried in the civilian courts and charging decisions are made by
regular civilian authorities. Venue for the trial of offenses by deployed personnel is
centralized in the civilian court in Kempten, Bavaria. See Act for Venue for Armed
Forces Under Special Deployment Abroad (Jan. 21, 2013). Additionally, Sweden no
longer has courts-martial. Criminal offenses by military personnel are prosecuted by
regular civilian authorities. See id.
116 Id.
117 Global Firepower Nations Index, Active Military Manpower (2020), archived at
https://perma.cc/L4SE-Y3AW.
118 The authors did not include Israeli statistics because the most recent information
they found available about Israeli sexual assault courts-martial was from 2013.
Statistics from the Israeli Forces should be considered because Israel is a democracy,
an ally of the United States, and has a military that has an outstanding reputation for
competence. In 2013, Israel used the centralized prosecution referral system that is
outside the chain of command. In 2013, the Israeli active duty population was 176,500
or four times as large as the active duty population of Fort Hood. Yet in 2012, Fort
Hood completed about the same number of military sex offense prosecutions as the
entire Israeli Defense Force (Fort Hood tried 26 sex offense courts-martial in FY 2012;
Israel averaged 23 indictments from 2008 to 2012). The 2013 study reported that “[t]he
entire Australian military justice system prosecuted an average of three felony-level
prosecutions the last two years; as compared to the U.S. military justice system that
prosecutes approximately 400 times as many felony-level cases.” Schenck, L., Fact
114
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Kingdom—have militaries with personnel strengths between about
60,000 and 150,000, 119 and the effectiveness of their prosecution
systems could therefore be compared to that of the United States.
Any assessment should consider the rates of sexual assault
prosecutions and convictions, where available, and compare those
rates with the rates of United States sexual assault courts-martial
prosecutions and convictions. It may not be possible to assess the
statistics of some of the allies because some of these countries might
not maintain statistics. Others might be unwilling to disclose
statistics on prosecutions.
The SAG Report further states:
The experience of other democratic countries that rely on
courts-martial for the trial of serious offenses by military
personnel with the charging power vested in a lawyer rather
than a lay commander demonstrates that such a system can
be put in place without compromising the effectiveness of
the nation’s defense capability.120
Notably, however, the SAG Report provides no measurement of
the effect on defense capability of transferring authority from the
commander to lawyers. The SAG Report does not give any examples
where prosecutions of serious crimes were more effective than the
current United States system where the convening authority refers
cases to trial. The United States is known for its powerful and
effective military, 121 and it serves as the model for our allies to

Sheet on Israeli Military Justice, 11 (Sept. 9, 2013), archived at https://perma.cc/M9R8K9GA.
119 Id.
120 SAG Report supra note 113, at 13.
121 President Barack Obama said in his farewell to the U.S. Armed Forces:
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emulate in many ways. None of our allies’ experiences have
demonstrated that the dilution of the authority of the commander to
enforce good order and discipline improved the effectiveness of their
military.
The Department of Defense “uses the term ‘sexual assault’ to
refer to a range of crimes, including rape, sexual assault, forcible
sodomy, aggravated sexual contact, abusive sexual contact, and
attempts to commit these offenses, as defined by the [UCMJ].”122 In
FY 2018, convening authorities referred 66% (378) cases (penetrative
and contact sexual assaults) to trial by general, special, and summary
court-martial, and in FY 2017, 64% (441) were referred to courtmartial.123 In FY 2018, convening authorities dismissed or resolved

America’s military remains by far the most capable fighting force on the face
of the earth. Our Army, tested by years of combat, is the best-trained and
best-equipped land force on the planet.
Our Navy is the largest and most lethal in the world, on track to surpass 300
ships. Our Air Force, with its precision and reach, is unmatched. Our Marine
Corps is the world’s only truly expeditionary force. Our Coast Guard is the
finest in the world. . . . [O]ur military stands apart as the most respected
institution in our nation by a mile.
Mahita Gajanan, President Obama's Farewell Address to the Armed Forces, TIME (Jan.
4, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/CJ22-W5E4. On February 5, 2020, President
Donald Trump said in his State of the Union Address, “Our military is completely
rebuilt, with its power being unmatched anywhere in the world — and it is not even
close.” Jim Garamone, Trump Touts Military Rebuilding, Space Force, Strikes Against
Terror, DOD NEWS (Feb. 5, 2020) archived at https://perma.cc/YM7B-XKEX. See also
Global Firepower 2021, archived at https://perma.cc/E5T8-JNNX (ranking the
United States as the undisputed most powerful military, followed by Russia and China
to complete the top three).
122 Department of Defense (DOD) Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military:
Fiscal Year 2019 (2020), at Appendix B [hereinafter 2019 SAPR Report], archived at
https://perma.cc/YL2G-4ZNS.
123 Defense Advisory Committee on Investigation, Prosecution, and Defense of Sexual
Assault in the Armed Forces (DAC-IPAD) Court-Martial Adjudication Data Report
(Nov. 2019) at 19 [hereinafter 2019 DAC-IPAD Report], archived at
https://perma.cc/H7QZ-RYGZ.
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through alternate administrative means 34% (196) of preferred cases.
Overall, 82% of referred cases in FY18 were referred to general courtmartial, and in FY 2017, 77% were referred to general courts-martial.
The more serious the sexual assault offense, the higher the level of
court-martial. General courts-martial (GCM) have authority to
sentence the accused to multiple years of confinement, whereas
special courts-martial sentences to confinement are limited to one
year and summary courts-martial sentences are limited to 30 days.
The following table shows referral levels for penetrative and contact
sexual offense cases completed in Fiscal Years 2015 through 2018.124
Table 1
Referral Levels of Penetrative Offenses and Contact Offenses
in United States Courts-Martial
(2015-2018)
Referral Level of
FY
FY
FY
FY
Penetrative Offenses
2015
2016
2017
2018
General Court-Martial
Lower Levels of CourtMartial
Referral Level of Contact
Offenses
General Court-Martial
Lower Levels of CourtMartial

124

Id. at 17.

94%
(376)
6% (23)

93%
(350)
7% (27)

92%
(300)
8% (25)

95%
(272)
5% (15)

FY
2015
40%
(64)
60%
(96)

FY
2016
44%
(51)
56%
(66)

FY
2017
35%
(40)
65%
(76)

FY
2018
43%
(39)
57%
(52)
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The following table depicts the number of substantiated reports
of sexual assault courts-martial cases tried to verdict, convictions of
any offense, and confinement adjudged.
Table 2
Substantiated Reports of Sexual Assault in United States CourtsMartial
(2015-2019)
Fiscal Year
2015125
2016
2017
2018
2019
Unrestricted
Reports130
Cases Tried for any
Offense
Convictions
Confinement
Adjudged

126

127

128

129

4,584

4,591

5,110

5,805

5,699

543

389

406

307

363

413
Not Indicated

261
196

284
227

203
157

264
227

Department of Defense (DOD) Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military:
Fiscal Year 2015 49 (2016), archived at https://perma.cc/V9N9-VUSU.
126 Department of Defense Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military: Fiscal Year
2016 (2017), at Appendix B, archived at https://perma.cc/RA67-RK38.
127 DOD SAPR Report, DOD Fiscal Year 2017 Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the
Military, Appendix B Statistical Data on Sexual Assault at 15, 25, archived at
https://perma.cc/F279-Y3BV.
128 DOD SAPR Report, DOD Fiscal Year 2018 Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the
Military, Appendix B Statistical Data on Sexual Assault at 11, 24, archived at
https://perma.cc/2FSD-N4Z3.
129 See 2019 SAPR Report, supra note 122.
130 Restricted reports of sexual assault are confidential, protected communications.
Unrestricted reports of sexual assault are referred for investigation to a military
criminal investigative organization, and the command is notified of the alleged
incident. 2019 SAPR Report, supra note 122, at 5, 11, 29.
125
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A series of studies have compared the rates of sexual assault
felony-level prosecutions in the Canadian, Australia, and United
Kingdom with those in the United States Armed Forces.131
1.

Canada

One study concluded that more than twice as many United States
personnel per capita were tried by courts-martial for sex offenses
than for Canadian Forces, even though the United States sex offense
report rate (assessed by military suspect) was 27% lower than the
Canadian rate. In Fiscal Year 2012, a single United States military
installation, Fort Hood, alone tried 3.7 times (26 Fort Hood versus 7
Canada) as many sex offenses by courts-martial as the entire
Canadian military, and obtained ten times (21 Fort Hood versus 2
Canada) as many sex offense courts-martial convictions.
The Canadian Armed Forces currently have 71,500 regular force
members.132 The United States Armed Forces have approximately 20
times more personnel than the Canadian Armed Forces. The number
of Canadian courts-martial prosecutions with at least one sexual
misconduct charge, and the number of convictions by reporting year
are depicted in the following table.

Schenck, L., Fact Sheet on Canadian Military Justice (Sept. 18, 2020) [hereinafter
Canada Fact Sheet], archived at https://perma.cc/9942-GFKK; Fact Sheet on United
Kingdom Military Justice (Corrected), (Sept. 22, 2020), archived at
https://perma.cc/LGQ4-X8ZL; Schenck, L., Fact Sheet on Australian Military Justice
(Sept. 13, 2013), archived at https://perma.cc/G7QT-AUC3.
132 National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, Government of Canada (Sep. 24,
2018), archived at https://perma.cc/X7UZ-U5TV.
131
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Table 3
Canadian Court-Martial Convictions
(2013-2019)
Year
Cases Tried
Convictions

’13-‘14

’14-‘15

’15-‘16

’16-‘17

’17-‘18

’18-‘19

6
4

10
5

7
7

12
10

20
15

20
14

During the 2018–2019 reporting period, Canada completed 20
courts-martial involving sexual misconduct charges, and 14 resulted
in a finding of guilt on at least one charge. 133 Of the 20 personnel
charged with sexual misconduct in 2018–2019, 6 were charged with
sexual assault, and the other charges related to prostitution, child
pornography, voyeurism, etc. None of the sexual assault charges
resulted in a finding of guilty.134
In the 2017–2018 reporting period, Canada also completed 20
courts-martial involving sexual misconduct with 15 of those
resulting in a guilty finding for at least one charge. However, there
were only 9 charges involving sexual assault, and the other charges
were for non-assault sexual crimes. Three were convicted of sexual
assault and received sentences including imprisonment ranging
from 9 to 22 months. In the entire Canadian military justice system
during the 2018–2019 reporting period, 43 sentences were
pronounced by courts-martial; however, only three cases resulted in

See Government of Canada, Judge Advocate General Annual Report 2018–2019
Annex B (2019), archived at https://perma.cc/MLN2-TSFV; Director of Military
Prosecutions, National Defense (Canada), Annual Report 2018–2019 50-56 (2019)
[hereinafter Canadian 2018-2019 DMP Report], archived at https://perma.cc/F9ETYXBZ; Director of Military Prosecutions, National Defence (Canada), Annual Report
2017-2018 (2018), archived at https://perma.cc/XAS3-2EZT.
134 Id.
133
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sentences to any imprisonment (5 days, 5 months, and 10 months
respectively). A Canadian survey revealed that in 2018, “the
prevalence of sexual assault among women in the Regular Force was
about four times that among men (4.3% versus 1.1%)”and totaled
“approximately 900 Regular Force members . . . representing 1.6% of
all Regular Force members.”135 In 2018, a U.S. study estimated 1.5%
of U.S. military personnel indicated they were sexually assaulted.136
The Canadian study showing the number of sexual assaults
committed by members of the Canadian armed forces may not be
comparable to the latest U.S. study because of different survey
methodology. For example, the response rate in the Canadian survey
“among Regular Force members was 52%,”137 and the U.S. military
personnel response rate was only 17%. 138 A low response rate leads
to the possibility of selection bias because victims of sexual assault
are more likely to report in surveys that they have been sexually
assaulted. Extrapolations from surveys with lower response rates are
more likely to may be inflated because of this selection bias. Thus, we
do not compare the total number of cases prosecuted divided by the
total number of cases for Canada or the United States. We do have
the total number of cases prosecuted and we divided that number by

Adam Cotter, Sexual misconduct in the Canadian Armed Forces Regular Force,
2018 [hereinafter Canadian Survey] (May 22, 2019) at 4, archived at
https://perma.cc/G8MU-H25S.
136 Annex 1: 2018 Workplace and Gender Relations Survey of Active Duty Members
Overview Report [hereinafter 2018 WGRA Report] (May 2019) at vi (”In 2018, 6.2% of
DOD women (an estimated 12,927 Service members) and 0.7% of DOD men (an
estimated 7,546 Service members) experienced a sexual assault in the past 12 months
(Figure 1). This was a statistically significant increase, from 4.3% in 2016, for DOD
women. There was no significant change from 2016 for DOD men.”), archived at
https://perma.cc/824S-4MNB. To determine the total DOD victims of sexual assault
in the previous 12 months, add 12,927 women plus 7,546 men equals 20,473. The 2018
WGRA Report used a DOD population of 1,327,194. Id. at 19. Dividing the 1,327,194
total population by 20,473 estimated victims of sexual assault equals 1.5%.
137 Canadian Survey at 55.
138 2018 WGRA Report at iv.
135
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the number of personnel in the Canadian military. There is no
compelling evidence that U.S. military personnel commit more
sexual assaults per capita than military personnel in any other
country. In sum, during the last two years the Canadian prosecutor
tried an average of 7.5 sexual assault cases each year and obtained an
average of 1.5 convictions each year, which is a much lower rate per
thousand than in the United States military justice system.
2.

Australia

The Australian Defence Force (ADF) has 58,680 active duty
personnel, and the United States Armed Forces is 23 times as large as
the ADF. 139 In the Australian military, the Director of Military
Prosecutions (DMP), chooses the level of trial for each accused. 140
Trials by a Defense Force Magistrate (DFM) or Restricted CourtMartial (RCM) have the power to impose a maximum sentence of six
months’ imprisonment. An Australian general court-martial (GCM)
may adjudge a sentence based on a particular offense of up to
confinement for life. The 2019 DMP report notes that on December 3,
2018, a captain was convicted of one count of sexual intercourse
without consent by a GCM and his sentence included 3 months
imprisonment. The 2017 DMP report states there was one GCM
during 2017 for a trial of an accused on a charge of sexual intercourse
without consent, and that accused was acquitted.141 The 2016 DMP
report states, “the majority of offences dealt with under the [Defence

Australian Government Department of Defense 2017–2018 Annual Report, Chapter
7 Strategic Workforce Management, archived at https://perma.cc/KXT9-W9DK.
140 Director of Military Prosecutions, Department of Defence, Australian Government,
Report for the Period 01 January to 31 December 2019 21-24 (2020) [hereinafter
Australian 2019 DMP Report], archived at https://perma.cc/Q3U3-3FW2.
141 Australian Government, Report for the Period 1 January to 31 December 2017 19,
22 (2018) [hereinafter Australian 2017 DMP Report], archived at
https://perma.cc/EKX9-3Y8J.
139
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Force Discipline Act] are acts of indecency. The more serious offences
are generally dealt with by the civilian authorities unless such
offending occurs overseas, where the Australian courts have no
jurisdiction.”142
The following table depicts the Australian DMP referral
decisions for all cases and provides the number of sexual offenses
sent to the DMP for a referral decision.

Director of Military Prosecutions, Department of Defense, Australian Government,
Report for the Period 1 January to 31 December 2016 24 (2017) [hereinafter Australian
2016 DMP Report], archived at https://perma.cc/3W8H-7ZY4.
142
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Table 4
Australian Referrals to Trial by Director of Military Prosecutions
(DMP)
(2016-2019)
Calendar Year
No Adverse
Action
Referred to unit
for Summary
Disposal
Defense Force
Magistrate
Restricted
Court-Martial
General CourtMartial
Sexual Offenses
Including
Sexual Assaults
Referred to
DMP for
Referral
Decision

2016143
49

2017144
38

2018145
Not
Available
Not
Available

2019146
54

22

9

36

32

33

42

3

0

4

1

0

1

1

0

15

14

Not
Available

46

37

Id. at 22-23, 25, Annex B.
Australian 2017 DMP Report, supra note 141, at 17, Annex B.
145 The DMP webpage does not include the 2018 DMP Report. For the statistics
provided, see Annex N to Judge Advocate General, Department of Defense, Australian
Government, Defence Force Discipline Act 1982: Report for the Period 1 January to 31
December 2018 (2019), archived at https://perma.cc/3DDT-PRRX.
146 Australian 2019 DMP Report, supra note 140, at 21–22, Annex A.
143
144
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The Australian Inspector General Report states, “[s]uperior trials
(courts martial and Defence Force magistrate trials) decreased by a
further six per cent, a trend that has been observed over the past five
financial years. In 2018-19 there were 30 superior trials recorded,
compared to 32 trials recorded in 2017-18.”147
In sum, only two Australian cases were tried at the general courtmartial level from 2016 to 2019, and one of them resulted in an
acquittal of the accused. Both of those general courts-martial were for
penetrative sexual assaults. 148 Australia should not be used for
comparison with the United States as there were only two felonylevel sexual assault prosecutions (trial by general court-martial) in
the previous four years, and only one general court-martial sexual
assault conviction.149
3.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom’s full-time trained strength as of October 1,
2017 was 137,280.150 The United States Armed Forces has about 10
times more active duty personnel than the United Kingdom.
Statistics from the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence indicate the

Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force, Annual Report 01 July 2018 to
30 June 2019 (2019), archived at https://perma.cc/NEV8-LNAT.
148 Australian 2019 DMP Report, supra note 140, at 21–24 (stating one penetrative
sexual assault was tried by general court-martial in December 2019 and resulted in a
finding of guilty); Australian 2017 DMP Report, supra note 141, at 17, 22 (stating one
allegation of sexual intercourse without consent was tried by general court-martial
and resulted in an acquittal); Australian 2016 DMP Report, supra note 142, at 46 (did
not describe any general courts-martial in 2017).
149 Australian 2016 DMP Report, supra note 142, at 46; Australian 2017 DMP Report,
supra note 141, at 17, 22; Australian 2019 DMP Report, supra note 140, at 21–24.
150 Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom), UK Armed Forces Monthly Service
Personnel Statistics 1 October 2017 (Nov. 16 2017), archived at
https://perma.cc/K7BS-V4VA. See also Strength of British Military Falls for Ninth Year,
BBC News (Aug. 16, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/WLB4-VUDV (indicating
the strength of the U.K. military was 133,460).
147
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following numbers for military personnel prosecuted and convicted
of sexual offenses and the most serious sexual offenses, rape or sexual
assault, as depicted in the following table. According to United
Kingdom statistics, if a defendant is charged with both rape and
sexual assault, the defendant is counted as one person in each
category. Thus, the number of persons prosecuted and convicted is
somewhat lower than the numbers shown on the following table.
Table 5
United Kingdom Statistics for Investigations, Prosecutions and
Convictions for Sexual Assaults
(2015-2018)
Year
Rape and Sexual Assault
Investigations155
Prosecutions for Rape or
Sexual Assault Offenses
Convictions for Rape or
Sexual Assault

2015151
69

2016152
86

2017153
93

2018154
109

44

38

56

43

19

14

17

13

Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom), Sexual Offences in the Service Justice
System: 2016 (2017), archived at https://perma.cc/36YJ-F6WB (information available
in the Excel spreadsheet at Tables 1 and 6).
152 Id.
153 Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom), Sexual Offences in the Service Justice
System: 2017 (Mar. 20, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/X2VS-YTZE (information
available in the Excel Spreadsheet at Tables 1 and 6).
154 Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom), Sexual Offences in the Service Justice
System: 2018 (2019), archived at https://perma.cc/NLW9-UG6M (information
available in the Excel spreadsheet at Tables 1 and 6).
155 Investigations do not include command referrals for prosecution.
151
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From 2015 to 2018, 53 United Kingdom military personnel were
prosecuted for rape, and only 8 were convicted of rape, a conviction
rate of 15% (8/53). 156 In 2018, the DAC-IPAD concluded that 431
personnel were charged with penetrative sexual assaults resulting in
81 convictions of a penetrative sexual assault offense, and 12
convictions of a non-penetrative sexual assault offenses for a
conviction rate of 22% (93/431).157 Thus, the United Kingdom had a
significantly lower conviction rate for penetrative sexual assault
offenses than the United States.
4.

General Observations

In 2019, the active duty military population of Fort Bragg, North
Carolina was 52,280.158 In Fiscal Year 2019, Fort Bragg alone took the
following actions at general courts-martial for soldiers charged with
at least one sexual assault charge involving an adult victim: 25
arraigned; 22 tried to verdict; and 13 convicted of at least one sexual
assault charge.159 In Fiscal Year 2019, Fort Bragg tried more sexual
assault cases than the Canadian military in the most recent year (22
Fort Bragg versus 6 Canada) and obtained 13 convictions whereas
the Canadian military did not obtain any sexual assault convictions.
Australia had only two felony-level sexual assault prosecutions (trial
by general court-martial) in the previous four years, and only one
general court-martial sexual assault conviction. 160 The number of

Sexual Offences in the Service Justice System: 2016, supra note 151 (information
available in the Excel spreadsheet at Table 6); Sexual Offences in the Service Justice
System: 2018, supra note 154 (information available in the Excel spreadsheet at Table
6).
157 2019 DAC-IPAD Report, supra note 123, at A-12.
158
Fort Bragg In-depth Overview, MILITARY INSTALLATIONS, archived at
https://perma.cc/L9VM-5DKS.
159 Statistics received on August 14, 2020, from Clerk of Court, U.S. Army Court of
Criminal Appeals.
160 See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
156
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United Kingdom personnel convicted of rape or sexual assault is the
same (13) as the number of Fort Bragg personnel convicted of sexual
assault in FY 2019 even though the population of the United
Kingdom military (137,280) is 2.63 times the size of the active duty
military population of Fort Bragg (52,280).
Comparisons of the rates of felony-level sexual assault
prosecutions with Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom do
not support removing commanders from the process for prosecuting
military sexual offenses because they do not provide evidence of
increased convictions for sexual assaults.
C. THE SAG REPORT ARGUMENTS TO ADOPT FOREIGN
MODELS.
As stated previously, the SAG Report suggests that Congress
emulate the practices used in other countries for determining which
cases should be referred to trial or alternatively, that a pilot program
could be used to test the viability of ending the commander’s
responsibility for ensuring prosecution of serious common law
offenses.161 As that group notes in its Report to the Senate and House
Armed Services Committees, several allies of the United States,
including the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada have
transferred responsibility for prosecution of sexual offenses from
commanders to attorneys.162 The rate of prosecution per thousand of
active duty personnel in the United Kingdom is about the same as in
the United States Department of Defense, however, the United
Kingdom conviction rate for rape is only 15%, while Canada and
Australia have much lower rates of prosecution of felony-level sexual
assaults. For example, Canadian military prosecutors did not obtain
any courts-martial convictions of military personnel for sexual

161
162

See SAG Report, supra note 113, at 12–15.
Id. at App. 16-17.
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assault in the most recent year in which statistics are available. 163 In
2019, Australia did not complete any general courts-martial for any
offense. 164 In the Australian Armed Forces, all offenses were
disposed of at military proceedings where the maximum
confinement was limited to six months, and the military personnel
who committed serious criminal offenses were tried in civilian
courts.
As the Appendix to the SAG Report reflects, the majority of allied
forces have also transferred responsibility for criminal cases from the
armed forces to civilian authorities. It is important to note, however,
that relinquishing jurisdiction to the civilian courts for criminal trials
of U.S. service members was tried for almost twenty years and failed.
Specifically, with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in O'Callahan v.
Parker165 in 1969 until 1987, when the Court overturned O’Callahan in
Solorio v. United States,166 service members could be tried by courtsmartial only for service-related crimes. Thus, the burden fell on the
civilian prosecutors to decide whether they wanted to try American
service members for offenses where, for example, the offense was
committed against civilians or occurred in the civilian community.167
VIII. THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS WILL ADVERSELY AFFECT
THE DELICATE BALANCE BETWEEN JUSTICE AND DISCIPLINE
There is a danger that in rushing to “fix” what some consider to
be problems in the military justice system, the delicate balance
between discipline and justice will be thrown off to the detriment of
the victims of the alleged offenses, those accused of committing
offenses, as well as the command structure overall.

Canadian 2018-2019 DMP Report, supra note 133, at Annex A.
Australian 2019 DMP Report, supra note 140, at 21-22, Annex A.
165 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
166 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
167 See supra note 56.
163
164
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The UCMJ was enacted in 1950 as a response to complaints and
concerns about the operation of the existing Articles of War during
World War II. In enacting the UCMJ, Congress struggled with the
issue of balancing the need for command control and discipline
against the view that the military justice system could be made fairer.
The final product was considered a compromise. On one hand, there
was concern about the ability of the commander to maintain
discipline within the ranks. On the other hand, there was concern
about protecting the rights of service members against the arbitrary
actions of commanders. Although the commander remained an
integral part of the military justice structure, the statute expanded
due process protections to service members and created a civilian
court to review courts-martial convictions. Since its enactment, the
UCMJ has been amended numerous times, sometimes favoring the
prosecution of offenses and at other times expanding the protections
of the accused.
The proposed amendments clearly undermine the commander’s
authority. Thus, whether intended or not, the change may tip the
balance in favor of the accused, even though the apparent intent is to
ensure that more cases go to trial. In so doing, it affects the very core
of the military justice system—the role of the commander. And it
adversely affects anyone associated with the alleged offenses in the
command—witnesses, counsel, and even victims. Currently, the
commander and his or her legal advisor carefully consider all of
those interests in deciding whether to prosecute a case or choose
some other route for dealing with the issue. Placing that decision in
some distant office creates the possibility that those diverse interests
are not adequately considered or balanced.
IX. RECENT STUDIES OF COMMAND DECISIONS TO PROSECUTE
SEXUAL ASSAULTS DEMONSTRATE THAT THE CURRENT
SYSTEM IS WORKING
In 2017, the DAC-IPAD formed a Case Review Working Group
(CRWG) consisting of seven Committee members to review
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individual cases involving sexual offenses. 168 The CRWG reviewed
2,055 investigative case files for probable cause against the subject
accused of committing the sexual offense, and found the following:
In about half of the cases reviewed by members that resulted
in no action against the subject for the penetrative sexual
offense, the reviewer determined that the victim’s statements
to law enforcement authorities were insufficient to establish
probable cause to believe that the subject committed the
offense.[169]
* * *
The CRWG found the commander’s initial disposition
decision to be reasonable in 155 of 164 cases (95%). In 42 of
the 164 cases (26%), the command preferred charges for a
penetrative sexual offense; in the remaining 122 cases (74%),
the command did not prefer charges against the subject for
the penetrative sexual offense.170
The committee concluded that the command reasonably decided
to prefer charges in 40 of 42 cases (95%) and not to prefer charges in
115 of 122 cases (94%).171 The Committee noted that, “many of the

See Defense Advisory Committee on Investigation, Prosecution, and Defense of
Sexual Assault in the Armed Forces (DAC-IPAD), Fourth Annual Report (Mar. 2020),
at 19-22 [hereinafter 2020 DAC-IPAD Report], archived at https://perma.cc/W7ZNJJDH.
169 Id. at 22.
170 Id. at 20.
171 Id. at 20 n.33. The committee explained their determination not to prefer charges in
94% of the cases was limited:
The remaining 6% of decisions not to prefer charges for a penetrative sexual
assault were found by the majority of reviewers not to be supported by the
evidence reviewed in the case file. The Committee members note that these
do not necessarily constitute cases in which charges should have been
168
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cases that cannot be prosecuted for evidentiary reasons—often
involve[ed] excessive alcohol consumption” by the victim of the
sexual offense.172
On November 2019, the DAC-IPAD issued a court-martial
adjudication data report (Nov. 2019 DAC-IPAD Report) that
included assessment of courts-martial dispositions of “charge sheets,
Article 32 reports, and Results of Trial forms for disposition and
adjudication outcomes,” 173 and on March 30, 2020, the DAC-IPAD
issued its Fourth Annual Report. 174 The DAC-IPAD database
includes records of filed sexual offense charges from 4,454 cases from
FY 2012 to 2018.
The 2020 DAC-IPAD annual report assessed the disposition of
cases in which Article 32 Preliminary Hearing Officers concluded
there was not probable cause to believe the accused committed the
charged offense, and the convening authority nevertheless referred
the charge to court-martial:
In FY17, 32 cases were referred to court-martial after an
Article 32 [P]reliminary [H]earing [O]fficer determined that
there was no probable cause to believe a penetrative sexual
offense occurred. Fifteen of the 32 referred cases (47%)

preferred; rather, the reviewers felt they would need to consider more
information before they could adequately evaluate whether the disposition
decision was reasonable. Such additional information could include a
review of the prosecution merits memorandum and perhaps interviews
with the judge advocates and commander involved. However, the
Committee felt that such an endeavor would be unnecessary, since review
of the 164 cases from the random sample reveals no sign of systemic
problems with the reasonableness of commanders’ decisions on whether to
prefer charges in cases involving a penetrative sexual assault.
2020 DAC-IPAD Report, supra note 168, 30.
172 Id. at 31.
173 2019 DAC-IPAD Report, supra note 123, at 1.
174 2020 DAC-IPAD Report, supra note 168.
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resulted in dismissal of the penetrative sexual offense(s). In
17 of the 32 cases (53%), the penetrative sexual offenses were
tried by court-martial. Of those penetrative sexual offense
cases that were tried by court-martial, more than threefourths (76%) resulted in verdicts of not guilty. Notably, one
of the guilty verdicts was overturned on appeal due to lack
of evidence.
* * *
In FY18, 18 cases were referred to court-martial after an
Article 32 [P]reliminary [H]earing [O]fficer determined that
there was no probable cause to believe a penetrative sex
offense occurred. Seven of the 18 referred cases (39%)
resulted in dismissal of the penetrative sexual offense(s). In
11 of the 18 cases (61%), the penetrative sexual offenses were
tried by court-martial. Of those penetrative sexual offense
cases that were tried by court-martial, nearly three-fourths
(73%) resulted in verdicts of not guilty. 175
The Article 32 Preliminary Hearing Officer is a legal officer, and
these dispositions show that in at least some cases convening
authorities are more willing to refer sexual assault cases to trial than
lawyers.
The CRWG plans to recommend additional efforts to improve
the quality and efficiency of criminal investigations, which should
result in additional prosecutions. 176 In 2020, the Policy Working
Group plans to analyze Article 32 preliminary hearings, including a
comparison with federal pretrial processes and a review of the
purposes and effectiveness of the Article 32 preliminary hearing.177

Id. at 52, 54.
Id. at 22–26.
177 Id. at 56.
175
176
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The Policy Working Group will examine disposition guidance for
judge advocates and convening authorities, and the effectiveness of
the Staff Judge Advocate’s pretrial advice.178
X. CONGRESS SHOULD AWAIT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
REFORMS INCLUDED IN THE MILITARY JUSTICE ACT OF 2016,
WHICH PROVIDES FOR OVERSIGHT AND STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS
The genesis of the proposed change to the Uniform Code of
Military Justice is apparently a concern that commanders abuse their
authority to decide who is prosecuted. Some observers allege that
commanders are unwilling to send cases of sexual assault to courtsmartial notwithstanding strong evidence of guilt because of their
close relationships with members of their command who may be
accused of crimes or friends of the accused. The Department of
Defense reduced the risk of this possibility by elevating any decision
not to prosecute a sexual assault offense to the O-6 special courtmartial convening authority level.
In the 2014 National Defense Authorization Act, 179 Congress
required an additional review of convening authorities’ decisions not
to refer charges of certain sex-related offenses for trial by courtmartial. This provision states:
In any case where a [S]taff [J]udge [A]dvocate, pursuant to
section 834 of title 10, United States Code (article 34 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice), recommends that charges
of a sex-related offense be referred for trial by court-martial

2020 DAC-IPAD Report, supra note 168, at 56.
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-66, 127
Stat. 981 (2013); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, Pub. L. No.
113-291, 128 Stat. 3372 (2014).
178
179
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and the convening authority decides not to refer any charges
to a court-martial, the convening authority shall forward the
case file to the Secretary of the military department
concerned for review as a superior authorized to exercise
general court-martial convening authority. . . .
In any case where a convening authority decides not to refer
a charge of a sex-related offense to trial by court-martial, the
Secretary of the military department concerned shall review
the decision as a superior authority authorized to exercise
general court-martial convening authority if the chief
prosecutor of the Armed Force concerned, in response to a
request by the detailed counsel for the Government, requests
review of the decision by the Secretary. . . .
In any case where a [S]taff [J]udge [A]dvocate, pursuant to
section 834 of title 10, United States Code (article 34 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice), recommends that charges
of a sex-related offense should not be referred for trial by
court-martial and the convening authority decides not to
refer any charges to a court-martial, the convening authority
shall forward the case file for review to the next superior
commander authorized to exercise general court-martial
convening authority. . . .
This provision ensures that any decision not to refer a sexual
assault to trial receives an additional review whenever the original
convening authority decides not to refer the case to trial by courtmartial. The reviewing convening authority has the authority to refer
the case to a court-martial. It is implicit that the higher-level
convening authorities that review a case have authority to hold any
lower level convening authority accountable for showing poor
judgment in referral decisions.
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In the Military Justice Act of 2016, 180 Congress also amended
Article 146, UCMJ, and created a “Military Justice Review Panel.”
That panel will conduct an in-depth review of the military justice
system every eight years, after its initial review in 2020. This is an
important step in ensuring that a designated body, apart from
Congress, will conduct thorough reviews of the system and offer
proposed changes to the Department of Defense.
In addition, Congress added provisions to create more
transparency for assessing the American military justice system. The
new Article 140a addresses the critical subject of determining trends
and issues across all of the Services.181 The new article was based on
an observation by the Response Systems to Adult Sexual Assault
Crimes Panel that there is lack of uniform, offense-specific sentencing
data from military courts which makes meaningful comparison and
analysis of military and civilian courts “difficult, if not
impossible.”182 Additionally, Article 140a requires the government to
facilitate the public’s access to all courts-martial filings and
records.183
These additions to the UCMJ can be invaluable tools for
reviewing and if necessary, reframing military justice procedures.
Congress should await those reports before making dramatic
changes to the military justice landscape that will radically change a
system that currently operates fairly and efficiently.

Military Justice Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-328, 130 Stat. 2962. See generally, David
A. Schlueter, Reforming Military Justice: An Analysis of the Military Justice Act of 2016, 49
St. Mary’s L.J. 1 (2017).
181 Art. 140a, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 940a (2018).
182 Response Systems to Adult Sexual Assault Crimes Panel Report, supra note 40, at
136–37.
183 That means that courts-martial filings will be available to the public in a manner
similar to what exists in the PACER system, which is used in the federal civilian court
system.
180
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XI. CONCLUSION: REAFFIRMING THE CRITICAL ROLE OF
COMMANDERS
On August 17, 2018, Secretary of Defense James Mattis, a retired
4-star general, clearly connected military readiness and mission
success with the commander’s responsibility to enforce discipline.
He wrote:
It is incumbent on our leaders to ensure that American
Forces are always the most disciplined on the battlefield.
Whatever the domain might be. . . . We must . . . remove the
cancer of sexual misconduct from our ranks. . . . Enforcing
standards is a critical component of making our force more
lethal. Our leaders must uphold proven standards. They
should know the difference between a mistake and a lack of
discipline. If a subordinate makes a mistake, leaders should
learn to coach them better. But we must not tolerate or ignore
lapses in discipline for our enemies will benefit if we do not
correct and appropriately punish substandard conduct. . . .
The military justice system is a powerful tool that preserves
good order and discipline while protecting the civil rights of
Service members. It is a commander's duty to use it. Military
leaders must not interfere with individual cases, but fairness
to the accused does not prevent military officers from
appropriately condemning and eradicating malignant
behavior from our ranks. Leaders must be willing to choose·
the harder right over the easier wrong. . . Discipline is a
competitive edge we must seek and maintain each day if we
are to keep America safe from its enemies. As General
Washington learned first hand, discipline will make us
stronger and more lethal. Therefore, let nothing prevent us
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from becoming the most disciplined force this world has
ever known.184
The problem of sexual assault allegations over the last decade
within the Department of Defense is cause for concern and requires
additional action by the chain of command, including more training
of personnel and prosecution of all cases whenever warranted. But
the answer to the problem does not rest in removing or reducing the
commander’s role. One feature of the military is that it responds and
adapts, and is capable to issue orders to correct problems. It is very
clear that the American military justice system has improved since
its founding and will continue to make adjustments to ensure both
discipline and justice.
We recommend that commanders continue to be responsible for
discipline in their commands and that the proposed amendments to
the UCMJ be rejected.
If Congress is to make any changes to the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, it should be to first reaffirm the view that the
primary purpose of the military justice system is to enforce good
order and discipline, and second, retain the commander’s critical role
in that system without limitation.
The Supreme Court of the United States has stated that the
purpose of the military is to fight and win wars. 185 To that end, it is
absolutely essential that commanders—who are ultimately
responsible for accomplishing that mission—be vested with the
authority and responsibility for maintaining good order and

U.S. Marine Corps, Secretary of Defense: Message to the force (Aug. 17, 2018), archived
at https://perma.cc/ND3G-5VHF. See also David Vergun, DOD Taking Steps to Prevent
Sexual Assault and Extremism, DEPT. OF DEFENSE NEWS (Feb. 19, 2021) (Secretary of
Defense Lloyd J. Austin III stated “Sexual assault and extremism will not be tolerated
in the Defense Department” and he said a commission will assess additional actions
to curb such conduct), archived at https://perma.cc/PM3G-3BE5.
185 United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955).
184
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discipline within their command. Accordingly, we recommend that
the UCMJ be amended by adding the following section, 10 U.S.C. §
801a:
§801a. Art. 1a. Purpose of Military Law:
The purpose of military law is to assist in maintaining good
order and discipline in the armed forces, to provide due
process of law, to promote efficiency and effectiveness in the
military establishment, and thereby to strengthen the
national security of the United States.
That proposed language, which is a variation of similar language
in the preamble to the Manual for Courts-Martial,186 reflects the longstanding and tested view that the military justice system is designed
primarily to promote good order and discipline.

The Preamble to the Manual for Courts-Martial lists the due process language first,
before the language concerning good order and discipline. In our view, the order of
those purposes is critical. Listing the discipline purpose first more accurately reflects
the function and purpose of the military justice system.
186
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